Treaties as Laws: A Defense of the Last-in-Time Rule for Treaties and Federal Statutes by Ku, Julian G.
Indiana Law Journal
Volume 80 | Issue 2 Article 3
Spring 2005
Treaties as Laws: A Defense of the Last-in-Time
Rule for Treaties and Federal Statutes
Julian G. Ku
Hofstra University School of Law, lawjgk@hofstra.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the International Law Commons, and the Legislation Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School
Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Indiana Law Journal by an authorized administrator of Digital
Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
Ku, Julian G. (2005) "Treaties as Laws: A Defense of the Last-in-Time Rule for Treaties and Federal Statutes," Indiana Law Journal:
Vol. 80: Iss. 2, Article 3.
Available at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol80/iss2/3
Treaties as Laws: A Defense of the Last-in-Time
Rule for Treaties and Federal Statutes
JULIAN G. Ku*
For nearly 150 years, courts have applied the "last-in-time" rule to resolve conflicts between
treaties and federal statutes by giving effect to whichever was enacted later in time. Despite its
acceptance by the courts, this rule has received unanimous criticism in the legal academy. In
this article, I present the first comprehensive defense of the last-in-time rule on textual,
structural, historical, and functional grounds. I argue that the last-in-time rule should be
applied because the text of the Constitution grants treaties the status of enacted domestic law.
As such, treaties are subject to the principle of statutory construction, leges posteriors priores
contrarias abrogant (later laws abrogate prior laws that are contrary), unless otherwise
indicated by the Constitution's text or structure. This understanding is supported by Supreme
Court precedent, historical evidence from the Founding era, including practice during the pre-
Constitution era, discussions during the Constitutional Convention and ratifying debates, as
well as actions during the early years of the constitutional era. In the course of defending the
last-in-time rule, I also consider how the rule fits into the broader debate over the extent to
which treaties, which increasingly seek to regulate traditionally domestic matters, have effect in
the U.S. legal system. The last-in-time rule, I contend, provides an elegant compromise between
internationalists seeking greater incorporation of treaties and revisionists seeking to limit or
eliminate such incorporation. Under the last-in-time rule, treaties are given direct domestic
effect, which facilitates greater U.S. participation in the international system. On the other
hand, the last-in-time rule guarantees that a politically accountable Congress retains the
flexibility to control a treaty's domestic effects.
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Although the Constitution declares that treaties are the "supreme Law of the Land,"'
the status of treaties in the American legal system is plagued by uncertainty. A court
considering a private individual's claim under a treaty must first consider a number of
complex questions such as whether the treaty is "self-executing," 2 whether the treaty's
effect is otherwise nullified by conditions placed on it during ratification, 3 whether the
treaty exceeds constitutional limitations on the exercise of the treaty power,4 and
whether the treaty conflicts with inconsistent federal and state law.
5
A court's task in applying these doctrines is complicated by sharp disagreements
among legal scholars about the proper way to resolve all of the aforementioned
questions. 6 These disagreements reflect a larger divide among scholars about the status
1. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2.
2. Compare Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332 (1924) (finding Seattle ordinance
violated treaty with Japan), with Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829), overruled by
United States v. Perchman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51 (1833) (refusing to give treaty with Spain
domestic effect).
3. Compare Domingues v. Nevada, 961 P.2d 1279 (Nev. 1998) (rejecting challenge to
Senate conditions on ratification of international human rights treaty), with id. at 1281 (Rose, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that court should remand to consider legal effect of Senate's conditions),
and RESTATEMENT (TIRD) oF THE FOREIGN RFLATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 313 (1987)
(suggesting that Senate's conditions are invalid).
4. Compare Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920) (upholding treaty's domestic
effect against Tenth Amendment federalism challenge), with Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty
Pawer and American Federalism, 97 MIcH. L. REv. 390,461 (1998) (arguing that "unlimited
[treaty making] power ... is inconsistent with a central principle of American federalism--that
the national government's powers are enumerated"), and Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957)
(holding that treaties and the laws enacted pursuant to them must comply with provisions of the
Constitution), and Peter J. Spiro, Treaties, International Law, and Constitutional Rights, 55
STAN. L. REv. 1999, 2027-28 (2003) (suggesting that constitutional limitations on treaties may
be unnecessary given protections provided by modem international human rights treaties).
5. Compare Chae Chan Ping v. United States (Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581
(1889) (holding that federal statute nullified domestic effect of treaty with China), with Louis
Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and
its Progeny, 100 HARv. L. REv. 853, 885-86 (1987) (arguing against rule permitting federal
statutes to override treaties' domestic effect).
6. Debates within the legal academy have raged in recent years over most of these
doctrines. With respect to self-execution, compare John C. Yoo, Globalism and the
Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self-Execution, and the Original Understanding, 99 COLUM. L.
REv. 1955, 2091 (1999) [hereinafter Yoo, Globalism] (arguing original understanding of
Constitution made almost all treaties non-self-executing), and John C. Yoo, Treaties and Public
Lawmaking: A Textual and Structural Defense ofNon-Self-Execution, 99 COLuM. L. REV. 2218,
2219 (1999) [hereinafter Yoo, Treaties] (arguing text and structure of Constitution support
presumption of non-self-execution), with Martin S. Flaherty, History Right?: Historical
Scholarship, Original Understanding, and Treaties as "Supreme Law of the Land," 99 COLUM.
L. REv. 2095 (1999) (questioning historical basis for non-self-execution), and Carlos Manuel
Vazquez, Laughing at Treaties, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 2154 (1999) (questioning textual and
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of treaties, as well as all kinds of international law ,7 within the American legal system.
On one side, scholars adhering to an "internationalist" conception believe that treaties
have domestic effect superseding inconsistent domestic law and that treaties should be
unconstrained by most constitutional limitations~g On the other side, revisionist scholars
have argued that treaties should be subject to strict political and constitutional
constraints, drastically limiting the effect that treaties have within the domestic legal
system.
9
These disagreements about the proper status of treaties in domestic law are not
merely academic. Due to the evolution of modern international law, treaties have the
potential to become a powerful form of domestic lawmaking within the United States.
Not only has the number of international conventions and treaties to which the United
States is a party increased,' 0 but the subjects of these treaties have increasingly turned
toward areas of law that have been traditionally governed exclusively by domestic
law. " This "new" type of international law is not just concerned with relations between
structural basis for non-self-execution). With respect to conditional consent, compare JOHN
NORTON MOORE, TREATY INTERPRETATION, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE RULE OF LAW 71-72
(2001) (attacking Senate conditions on human rights treaties), with Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L.
Goldsmith, Treaties, Human Rights, and Conditional Consent, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 399,457-60
(2000) (defending practice of attaching conditions to human rights treaties), and David Sloss,
The Domestication of International Human Rights: Non-Self-Executing Declarations and
Human Rights Treaties, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 129, 135-36 (1999) (arguing that conditions do not
preclude all domestic effect of human rights treaties). With respect to federalism and the treaty
power, compare Bradley, supra note 4, with David M. Golove, Treaty Making and the Nation:
The Historical Foundations of the Nationalist Conception of the Treaty Power, 98 MICH. L.
REV. 1075, 1313-15 (2000) (defending broad nationalist treaty power on historical grounds).
7. Treaties are only one source of international law. The status of customary
international law, the other main source of international law in the U.S. system, has also been
the subject of substantial academic debate. Compare Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith,
Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modem Position, 110
HARv. L. REV. 815, 870 (1997) (arguing that "in the absence of federal political branch
authorization, [customary international law] is not a source of federal law"), with Harold Hongju
Koh, Is International Law Really State Law?, 111 HARv. L. REV. 1824 (1998) (arguing that the
"practice of treating international law as federal law" should be left undisturbed by both the
political and judicial branches). The Supreme Court recently entered into this debate by
upholding federal court application of customary international law in the context of suits under
the Alien Tort Statute. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739 (2004). For a review and
functional critique of the Court's decision, see Julian Ku and John Yoo, Foreign Competence:
Formalism, Functionalism, and the Alien Tort Statute, 2005 Sup. CT. REV. (forthcoming 2005).
For the purposes of this article, however, the relationship of customary international law to other
forms of domestic law raises a distinct question from the status of treaties.
8. For further explanation of the "internationalist conception," see infra Part I.A.
9. For further explanation of "revisionism" and "sovereigntism," see infra Part I.B.
10. See, e.g., CONGRESsIoNALREsEARcH SERVICE, S. RPT. 106-71, TREATIES AND OTHER
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: THE ROLE OFTHE UNITED STATES SENATE, 39 (2001) (reporting
that the United States is now party to 600 treaties and nearly 11,000 separate executive
agreements).
11. See Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism H, 99 MICH. L.
REV. 98, 105-06 (2000) (arguing that subject matter of treaties overlaps with traditional areas of
state control in the U.S. system). For instance, modern treaties now seek to regulate matters as
diverse as family law, probate law, commercial law, and criminal law. See id.
2005]
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nation-states. Rather, it also seeks to regulate a nation's relationship with its own
citizens.' 2 Thus, in recent years, the United States has entered into (or considered
entering into) treaties regulating commercial law, 13 probate law,' 4 environmental law,'5
family law,' 6 individual rights,' 7 and an assortment of other areas of law.
Not only does the new international law seek to regulate different areas of law, but
the administration and interpretation of new international law treaties is often delegated
to international institutions.' 8 This trend increases the likelihood of conflict between
treaties and domestic law. For instance, in recent years the International Court of
Justice ("ICJ") has twice found that U.S. domestic law limiting habeas corpus appeals
violated U.S. treaty obligations to guarantee consular notification rights to foreign
nationals charged with capital crimes.' 9 The ICJ found a conflict between the treaty
and U.S. law even though the U.S. government offered a plausible alternative
interpretation of the treaty that avoided conflict with domestic law.
20
12. Paul Stephan, The New International Law-Legitimacy, Accountability, Authority,
and Freedom in the New Global Order, 70 U. CoLO. L. REv. 1555, 1556-62 (1999) (describing
a new international law regulating relations between nation-states and their own citizens).
13. See, e.g., United Nations Convention on Independent Guarantees and Stand-by
Letters of Credit, done Dec. 11, 1995, 2169 U.N.T.S. 190, 35 I.L.M. 735; United Nations
Convention on International Bills of Exchange and International Promissory Notes, opened for
signature Dec. 9, 1988, 28 I.L.M. 170; United Nations Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods, signed Apr. 11, 1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 58, 19 I.L.M. 668.
14. See, e.g., Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Succession to the Estates of
Deceased Persons, opened for signature Aug. 1, 1989,28 I.L.M. 146; Hague Convention on the
Law Applicable to Trusts and on Their Recognition, opened for signature Oct. 20, 1984, 23
I.L.M. 1388; Hague Convention Providing a Uniform Law on the Form of an International Will,
opened for signature Oct. 26, 1973, 12 I.L.M. 1298.
15. See, e.g., Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22; Montreal Protocol on Substances
that Deplete the Ozone Layer, signed Sept. 16, 1987, 26 I.L.M. 1541.
16. See, e.g., Hague Convention on the Protection of Children and Co-operation in
Respect of Intercountry Adoption, opened for signature May 29, 1993, 1870 U.N.T.S. 182, 32
I.L.M. 1134; Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, signed
July 1, 1988, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, 1343 U.N.T.S. 98.
17. See, e.g., International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, signed Nov. 20, 1994, 660 U.N.T.S. 212, 5 I.L.M. 352; International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, signed Sept. 8, 1992, 999 U.N.T.S. 172, 6 I.L.M. 368; Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, opened for signature Mar.
1, 1980, 1249 U.N.T.S. 14, 19 I.L.M. 33.
18. Julian G. Ku, The Delegation of Federal Power to International Organizations:
New Problems with Old Solutions, 85 MINN. L. REv. 71, 83-87 (2000) (explaining the new
international law as a form of "international legislation" administered and interpreted by
international organizations).
19. See Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.) 2004 I.C.J. 128 (Final
Judgment of Mar. 31); LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466, 497-98 (June 27)
(finding U.S. limitations on the right of foreign nationals to appeal capital convictions violated
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations) [hereinafter LaGrand Judgment).
20. Avena, Counter-Memorial of the United States i 6.67-6.100; LaGrand Judgment,
supra note 19, at 496-98 (describing and rejecting U.S. interpretation of treaty obligation); see
[Vol. 80:319
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The ICJ is not the only international institution that has found conflict between U.S.
domestic law and treaties. The World Trade Organization has found a number of U.S.
domestic laws to violate treaty obligations.2' United States courts have also considered
conflicts between federal law and resolutions issued by the United Nations Security
Council and its related committees.
22
Of course, conflicts between international treaties and domestic law can occur
without the involvement of an international institution. For example, the United States
has drawn international criticism for overriding bilateral tax treaty obligations through
changes to its tax laws. 23 Thus, as treaties become more ubiquitous, and their
interpretation is allocated to international institutions, the likelihood of direct conflict
between treaties and domestic U.S. law increases.
To resolve conflicts with federal statutes, courts apply one of the most important
doctrines governing the domestic effect of treaties: the "last-in-time" rule. This
doctrine holds that when a treaty and federal statute conflict, whichever was enacted
last in time controls.24
Although they disagree on most other questions of treaty law, both internationalist
and revisionist scholars have criticized the last-in-time rule. The critique of the last-in-
time rule has three main components. First, scholars argue that the rule rests on
"weakly reasoned" interpretations of the constitutional text 25 unsupported by structural
inferences.26 Second, scholars claim that the historical evidence from the Founding
period does not support the application of the last-in-time rule to treaties and federal
also Counter-Memorial of the U.S. (F.R.G. v. U.S.), at http://www.icj-cij.org, Tj 76-103
(March 27, 2000) [hereinafter LaGrand Counter-Memorial].
21. See, e.g., United States-Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain Steel
Products, available at http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/WT/DS/259ABR.doc (July
11, 2003) (finding that U.S. tariffs on steel imports violate World Trade Organization
Agreement); United States-Tax Treatment for "Foreign Sales Corporations," available at
http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/tIWT/DS/l08ABR.DOC (Feb. 24, 2000) (finding
U.S. tax laws violate WTO Agreement); United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp
and Shrimp Products, available at
http://docsonline.wto.brg/DDFDocuments/t/WT/DS/58ABR.DOC (Oct. 12, 1998) (finding U.S.
restrictions on import of shrimp to protect sea turtles violate WTO Agreement).
22. See, e.g., Beazley v. Johnson, 242 F.3d 248 (5th Cir. 2001) (refusing to give effect
to interpretation of international human rights treaty issued by United Nations Human Rights
Committee); Diggs v. Shultz, 470 F.2d 461 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (refusing to override federal statute
that appeared to violate U.N. Security Council resolution); S. REP. No. 92-359, at 131 (1971)
(Byrd Amendment); S.C. Res. 232, U.N. SCOR, 21st Sess., 1340th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/232
(1966).
23. See, e.g., Letter from Emmanuel de Margerie, France's Ambassador to the United
States, to James A. Baker I, United States Treasury Secretary (July 16, 1987), reprinted in
EEC Group of Six Addresses 1986 Act's Treaty Override Provisions, 36 TAX NOTES 437 (1987);
New York State Bar Ass'n, Tax Sect. Comm. on U.S. Activities of Foreign Taxpayers and
Comm. on Foreign Activities of U.S. Taxpayers, Legislative Overrides of Tax Treaties,
reprinted in 37 TAX NOTES 931 (1987); OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs, Report on Tax
Treaty Overrides (1989), reprinted in 2 TAx NOTES INT'L 25 (1990).
24. See Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190 (1888); Taylor v. Morton, 23 F. Cas. 784
(C.C.D. Mass. 1855), affd on other grounds, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 481 (1862).
25. See, e.g., Henkin, supra note 5, at 871-72.




statutes.27 Third, scholars have suggested that the rise of the new international law
changes the functional case for adhering to the last-in-time rule. Some argue that
treaties should then hold superior status to all federal statutes.28 Others take the
opposite view, arguing that federal statutes should have superior status over all
treaties.
29
From both perspectives, however, the functional consequences of the last-in-time
rule weigh against its continued application. Thus, despite its acceptance bycourts, the
last-in-time rule suffers from near unanimous criticism in the academy accompanied by
periodic calls for its abandonment.30
This article offers the first comprehensive scholarly defense of the last-in-time
rule. 3 1 It argues that, contrary to the prevailing academic consensus, there is a
compelling textual and structural basis for the last-in-time rule. The crucial textual
hook is the Supremacy Clause's designation of treaties as "Law." 32 As Chief Justice
Marshall recognized, this language made treaties "equivalent to an act of legislature"
for purposes of U.S. domestic law. Therefore, treaties, as acts of the legislature, are
subject to the traditional maxim leges posteriors priores contrarias abrogant (later
laws abrogate prior laws that are contrary),33 for resolving conflicts between different
forms of enacted law. I argue that by giving treaties the status of domestic law, the
drafters of the Constitution presumed that thepriores contrarias doctrine would apply
to conflicts between treaties and other forms of enacted law.34
No previous discussion of the last-in-time rule has considered the significance of
this traditional maxim of statutory construction. Indeed, the leading historical account
of the last-in-time rule locates its origins in nineteenth century conceptions of "absolute
27. Jules Lobel, The Limits of Constitutional Power: Conflicts Between Foreign Policy
and International Law, 71 VA. L. REv. 1071, 1091-100 (1987).
28. Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 210-11
(1996)1; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 115 rep. n.1 (1987).
29. See THE CONSTITuTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, S. Doc. No. 82-170, at
421-23 (Edward S. Corwin ed.) (1953) (arguing for giving statutes supreme status over
treaties); John C. Yoo, Laws as Treaties?: The Constitutionality of Congressional-Executive
Agreements, 99 MICH. L. REv. 757, 790-99 (2001) (arguing that formalist structure requires
giving statutes supremacy over subsequent treaties).
30. Scholars have been calling for the abandonment of the rule for many decades. See,
e.g., Richard B. Lillich, The Proper Role of Domestic Courts in the International Legal Order,
11 VA. J. INT'L L. 9, 50 (1970) (arguing against last-in-time rule); The Nuremberg Trials and
Objection to Military Service in Viet-Nam, 63 AM. Soc. INT'L L. PROC. 140, 180 (1969)
(remarks of Louis B. Sohn).
31. No academic discussion of the last-in-time rule has ever defended application of the
rule. See, e.g., HENKIN, supra note 28, at 209-11; PAUST, supra note 26, at 117-118, 120;
Lobel, supra note 27, at 1091-100; Detlev F. Vagts, The United States and Its Treaties:
Observance and Breach, 95 AM. J. INT'LL. 313, 313-21 (2001). Even older discussions of the
rule have argued for its rejection, albeit on the grounds that statutes should always trump
treaties. See, e.g., 1 Wn_.LouGHBY, THE CONSTrrTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 306 (1910).
32. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl.2.
33. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 899 (6th ed. 1990).
34. See discussion infra Part IV.
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sovereignty" and does not mention priores contrarias3 5 Such an oversight
demonstrates that academic critics of the rule have failed to grasp the importance of
treaties' status as domestic "Law" and thus the background assumptions that such
status carries.
As I explain, the last-in-time rule, in the form of the priores contrarias maxim, was
well known to members of the Founding generation. 36 In fact, the priores contrarias
maxim was widely invoked during the Articles of Confederation period as grounds for
ignoring earlier in time treaties. Some important Founders, including James Madison,
recognized that the Articles themselves were a kind of treaty that a state legislature
could modify and repeal through the passage of a later in time statute. The supremacy
of later-in-time statutes over treaties helps to explain the Founders' insistence on
creating a new sort of "fundamental" constitutional law supreme over all others. The
designation of constitutional law as "higher law" was, as many historians argue, an
intellectual innovation of the Founding generation. Contrary to prior accounts of the
Founders' treatment of the last-in-time rule, there is no evidence that the Founders
sought to give similar "higher law" status to treaties. Nor is there evidence that they
sought to subordinate treaties to federal statutes. Rather, the bulk of the historical
evidence confirms that priores contrarias continued to serve as the rule for resolving
conflicts between different types of enacted laws, including treaties and federal
statutes.
37
Because some might dismiss the historical foundations of the last-in-time rule as
irrelevant to the modern era of globalization and the new international law, I also offer
a functional defense of the rule. I believe the last-in-time rule's assumption that treaties
and federal statutes are equivalent for domestic law purposes provides a sensible model
for the incorporation of modem treaties into the U.S. legal system.38 An "equality"
view of treaties and statutes rejects more radical revisionist claims about the limited
domestic status of treaties and supports the internationalist conception of treaties as
self-executing laws. At the same time, the equality view also rejects more radical
internationalist claims seeking to give treaties "higher-law" status, free even from some
constitutional limitations flowing from federalism or individual rights.
39
In this way, the last-in-time rule offers an elegant compromise between attempts to
eliminate most domestic effects of treaties and attempts to enshrine treaties with a
higher-law status. In an era of "new" international law, treaties and traditional domestic
lawmaking will increasingly overlap and collide. The last-in-time rule mediates many
of these conflicts by preserving a role for treaties in domestic lawmaking that allows
the United States to participate (if it chooses) in the development of the new
international law through treaties with immediate domestic effect.
On the other hand, the rule also shifts control over how and when to give treaties
domestic effect to the more politically accountable branches, Congress and the
President. ° Unlike the more rigid "higher law" rule supported by internationalists, the
last-in-time rule gives the U.S. Government the flexibility to suspend the last-in-time
35. See Lobel, supra note 27, at 1100.
36. See infra Part IV.B.3.
37. See infra Part IV.B.2.
38. See infra Part V.




rule by statute when they believe such a suspension is necessary on policy grounds.
Giving Congress such political flexibility may actually foster, rather than hinder, U.S.
participation in the development of the new international law.4'
The Article proceeds as follows: Part I describes the effect of the last-in-time rule
on the new international law. Part II reviews the broader conceptual divide among
scholars over the proper status of treaties as domestic law. Part III outlines a textual
and structural defense of the last-in-time rule. Part IV discusses the historical evidence
supporting this understanding. Part V concludes by considering the doctrinal and
functional consequences of accepting the last-in-time rule.
I. THE LAST-N-TIME RULE AND THE NEW INTERNATIONAL LAW
Although the proper status of treaties as domestic law has troubled courts and
commentators since the ratification of the Constitution in 1789, the rise of a new kind
of international law at the end of the twentieth century has dramatically heightened the
significance of treaties for the domestic legal system. In this Part, I discuss the rise of
this new type of international law and its relationship with treaties. I then introduce the
last-in-time rule and discuss its practical and doctrinal significance for the new
international law.
A. The Rising Importance of Treaties as Domestic Law
Treaties played a central role in American history even before the establishment of
the Constitution in 1789. During the Revolutionary War, American commissioners
negotiated crucial treaties of alliance and friendship with major European powers42 and
American independence was secured by the 1783 peace treaty with Great Britain
ending the war and conferring British recognition of the new United States.43
While treaties have always mattered, historically, treaties only indirectly regulated
matters of domestic affairs. For instance, the 1783 peace treaty with Britain required,
as a condition of peace, the recognition of debts to British creditors.44 Such a treaty had
effects on domestic affairs by limiting the effect of domestic law on British nationals,
41. See infra Part V.B.
42. See, e.g., Treaty of Alliance Between the United States of America and His Most
Christian Majesty, Feb. 6, 1778, U.S.-Fr., 8 Stat. 6.
43. Provisional Articles Between the United States of America, and his Britannic
Majesty, Nov. 30, 1782, U.S.-Gr. Brit., art. 1, 8 Stat. 54 [hereinafter Provisional Articles] ("His
Britannic Majesty acknowledges the said United States . . . to be free, sovereign and
independent States"). Indeed, foreign policy stood at the center of the concerns facing the
drafters of the Constitution and the first presidential administrations. For general histories of
early foreign policy, see, for example, FELIX GILBERT, To THE FAREWELL ADDRESS: IDEAS OF
AMERICAN FOREIGN POuCY (1961); FREDERICK W. MARKS, INDEPENDENCE ON TRIAL: FOREIGN
AFFAIRS AND THEMAKING OFTHECONSTUTION (Scholarly Resources ed. 1986) (1973); PAULA.
VARG, FOREIGN POLICIES OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS (1963).
44. Provisional Articles, supra note 43, at art. IV, 8 Stat. 54. ("It is agreed that creditors
on either side, shall meet with no lawful impediment to the recovery of the full value in sterling
money, of all bona fide debts heretofore contracted.").
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but only as part of the larger (and far more important) foreign policy issue of achieving
peace with Britain.
Similarly, treaties of friendship and commerce, a common form of treaty in the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, generally conferred certain reciprocal rights
for foreign nationals in the United States but did not seek to directly alter domestic
laws except in application to foreign nationals. Thus, the Supreme Court famously
struck down a Seattle regulation discriminating against Japanese nationals as violating
a treaty with Japan.45 The treaty with Japan did not purport to prescribe any particular
kind of domestic regulation. Rather, it simply required non-discriminatory application
of domestic law toward Japanese nationals. 46 The treaty had nothing to say, for
instance, about the effect of the Seattle ordinance on U.S. nationals.
Both of these treaties reflect the traditional concerns of international law: the
relationship between individual nation-states.47 Individuals were relevant only to the
extent their activities implicated state-to-state relations. As Professor Stephan has
observed, the twentieth century has seen the rise of a "new" international law.48 This
new international law has two important characteristics that distinguish it from
traditional international law.
First, rather than exclusively focusing on state-to-state relations, or even a state's
relations with foreign nationals, the new international law has expanded its subject
matter to include relations between a nation-state and its own nationals. 49 Second,
while traditional international law usually took the form of a bilateral treaty
administered by the nation-states themselves, the "new" international law usually takes
the form of a multilateral treaty administered by an international institution.
5 0
45. Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332 (1924).
46. Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, February 21, 1911, U.S.-Japan, art. 1, 37
U.S.T. 1504:
The citizens or subjects of each of the High Contracting Parties shall have
liberty to enter, travel and reside in the territories of the other to carry on
trade, wholesale and retail, to own or lease and occupy houses,
manufactories, warehouses and shops, to employ agents of their choice, to
lease land for residential and commercial purposes, and generally to do
anything incident to or necessary for trade upon the same terms as native
citizens or subjects, submitting themselves to the laws and regulations there
established.... The citizens or subjects of each.., shall receive, in the
territories of the other, the most constant protection and security of their
persons and property ....
Id. at 1504.
47. See Stephan, supra note 12, at 1556-62. See also MALCOLM N. SHAW,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 126 (2d ed. 1986) (describing "orthodox positivist doctrine... that only
states are subjects of international law").
48. Stephan, supra note 12, at 1556-62.
49. id.; see also RESTATEMENT (THRD) OFTHE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OFTHE UNrrED
STATES § 101 rep. n.1 (1987) (unequivocally stating that international law concerns nations'
relations with its own nationals). But cf Barcelona Traction, Light, and Power Co. (Belg. v.
Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 44 (Feb. 5) (declaring that the State decides through muncipal law what
international law protections its citizens have against other nations).




For example, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR"),
which the United States and nearly one hundred other nations have signed and ratified,
obligates nations to guarantee certain individual rights and protections. Such
protections extend to all citizens, including a state's own citizens, and do not depend
on reciprocal recognition by other signatory nations. s' In contrast to traditional treaties,
a nation can violate an ICCPR obligation by mistreating its own citizens in the
application of its own domestic law.5
2
Indeed, many of the ICCPR's obligations could be read to conflict with a variety of
U.S. federal and state laws.53 Most dramatically, Article 6 of the ICCPR prohibits
parties from imposing death sentences for "crimes committed by persons below
eighteen years of age."5 4 Because the United States does in fact impose such sentences
at the state and possibly the federal level, it has declared that it will not adhere to that
provision of the ICCPR.55 Even with this reservation, the United Nations Human
Rights Committee, an international organization charged with overseeing compliance
with the treaty, held that the United States is nonetheless bound by the ICCPR to end
its practice of imposing the death penalty on juveniles.
5 6
In this way, the ICCPR illustrates the potential of modern treaties to enter into areas
of law, such as criminal punishment of U.S. citizens, that had previously been the
exclusive province of domestic state and federal law. Although the application of the
non-self-execution doctrine has limited the domestic effect of the ICCPR, the treaty is
only non-self-executing by virtue of controversial unilateral reservations imposed by
the U.S. Senate as a condition of ratification. The legality of these reservations has
been sharply challenged by legal academics,5 7 although courts have so far given the
reservations effect.58 This means that absent a reservation, traditionally domestic
51. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, 21
U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at art. 2, U.N. Doe. A/6316 (1966) [hereinafter lCCPR].
52. Id.
53. For example, the ICCPR bans "propaganda for war" and "advocacy of national...
or religious hatred." Id. at art. 20. Both provisions arguably conflict with existing First
Amendment protection of political and hate speech. See 138 CONG. REC. S4781-01 (1992).
54. ICCPR, supra note 51, at art. 6.
55. See 138 CONG. REc. S4781-01, § 1(2).
56. General Comment No. 24: Issues Relating to Reservations Made upon Ratification
or Accession to the Covenant or the Optional Protocols Thereto, or in Relation to Declarations
Under Article 41 of the Covenant, U.N. GAOR Human Rights Comm., 52d Sess., 1382d mtg.,
at 5-6, 8, 18, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.l/Add.6 (1994) [hereinafter General Comment].
57. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
313 (1987) (suggesting that Senate's conditions are invalid); see also MOORE, supra note 6, at
71-112; Stefan A. Riesenfeld & Frederick M. Abbott, The Scope of U.S. Senate Control Over
the Conclusion and Operation of Treaties, 67 CHi-KENT L. REv. 571,589-601,632-43 (1991);
Sloss, supra note 6, at 135-36. But see Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 6, at 457-60.
58. Domingues v. State, 961 P.2d 1279 (Nev. 1998) (rejecting challenge to Senate
conditions on ratification of international human rights treaty). But see id. at 1281 (Rose, J.,




matters concerning criminal law,59 family law,6° and probate law61 could be directly
regulated by a treaty rather than by a state or federal statute.
62
2. International Institutions
The likelihood that treaties will conflict with domestic law is not simply a result of
the new international law's expanded subject matter. The role of international
institutions in the administration of the new international law also increases the
likelihood of conflict because, unlike U.S. courts, 63 international institutions do not
have an obligation to seek interpretations that avoid conflicts between treaties and
domestic law. Instead, such institutions are typically charged with interpreting and
applying international law and treaties to any matters within their jurisdiction,
irrespective of conflicts with domestic law. The willingness of international institutions
to find conflicts between domestic and treaty law can be seen most clearly in the
United States' continuing dispute with the International Court of Justice ("ICJ") over
the implementation of U.S. obligations under the Vienna Convention for Consular
Relations.
6 4
In the past seven years, the ICJ has issued three opinions ordering the United States
to suspend executions of foreign nationals convicted of capital crimes under various
state laws.65 The main question for the ICJ was whether the Vienna Convention's
guarantee to each foreign national the right to consult with his or her consular official
59. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 51, at arts. 6-9, 11-14 (regulating rights of criminal
defendants and prohibiting certain punishments).
60. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 51, at art. 23 (guaranteeing right of marriage and
protection of spouses during marriage).
61. See, e.g., Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Succession to the Estates of
Deceased Persons, supra note 14; Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Trusts and on
their Recognition, supra note 14; Hague Convention Providing a Uniform Law on the Form of
An International Will, supra note 14.
62. For a review of the complex interaction between private international law treaties
and domestic law, especially state law, see Julian G. Ku, The State of New York Does Exist:
How the States Control Compliance with International Law, 82 N.C. L. REV. 457, 459-60
(2004).
63. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNrrED STATES §
114 (1987) ("Where fairly possible, a United States statute is to be construed so as not to
conflict with international law or with an international agreement of the United States.");
Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (holding that "an act of
Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible
construction remains .... ); see also Ma v. Reno, 208 F.3d 815 (9th Cir. 2000), reaffd and
amended by Ma v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 2001) (interpreting 8 U.S.C. § 123 l(a)(6)
to avoid conflict with article 9 of ICCPR).
64. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and Optional Protocol on Disputes, Apr.
24, 1963, art. 36, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 262 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
65. See Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.) 2004 I.C.J. 128 (Final
Judgment of Mar. 31); LaGrand Judgment, supra note 19; Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations (Para. v. U.S.) 1998 I.C.J. 99 (Provisional Measures Order of April 9) [hereinafter




after being arrested6 was violated by U.S. domestic laws limiting the ability of
convicted defendants to raise Vienna Convention claims in habeas corpus
proceedings.67 In the two cases that reached a final judgment, the U.S. government
offered treaty interpretations that avoided conflict with domestic U.S. law. It argued
that Article 36 of the Vienna Convention does not require giving individual defendants
the right to raise treaty violations in any subsequent criminal proceedings, including
habeas corpus 6 and further argued that Article 36 obligations could be satisfied by
state clemency proceedings.69 Indeed, the language of Article 36 is somewhat
ambiguous, requiring that any consular rights "shall be exercised in conformity with
the laws and regulations of the receiving State, subject to the proviso, however, that the
said laws and regulations must enable full effect to be given to the purposes for which
the rights accorded under this Article are intended., 70 The United States argued that the
"full effect" language referred only to the laws governing the initial arrest. It contended
that nothing in the language of the provision required granting rights in subsequent
post-conviction proceedings.7' After losing on this point, it then argued that nothing in
this language required a judicial proceeding as opposed to an administrative review. 72
The point is not that the United States' interpretation of the treaty is the correct one.
Rather, the point is that its interpretation is a plausible one that gives effect to both the
treaty (where rights of consular notification are required at the time of a foreign
national's arrest) and the federal statute (limiting post-conviction remedies). The ICJ,
however, chose another equally plausible interpretation of "full effect" that required
the United States to modify its domestic law to comply with the treaty."
In sum, the new international law's broader subject-matter focus means that it is
more likely to spill over into areas already regulated in the United States by domestic
state and federal law. The role of international institutions in the interpretation of the
new international law, especially in the form of treaties, is also likely to lead to more
conflicts with domestic law. While such conflicts could and did occur in the past, there
is good reason to presume that the sheer number of modern treaties, combined with
their subject matter, will increase the chances of more frequent conflicts in the future.
66. Vienna Convention, supra note 64, 21 U.S.T. at 100-01,596 U.N.T.S. at 292, 294.
67. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a),
(e)(2) (2000). See Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998) (interpreting AEDPA so that a habeas
petitioner alleging violation of "'treaties of the United States' will, as a general rule, not be
afforded an evidentiary hearing if he 'has failed to develop the factual basis of [the] claim in
State court proceedings' (quoting §§ 2254(a), (e)(2))).
68. LaGrand Counter-Memorial, supra note 20, at 1[ 78-81.
69. Avena, Counter-Memorial of the United States, supra note 20, at 16.67-6.100.
70. Vienna Convention, supra note 64, at art. 36(2) (emphasis added).
71. LaGrand Counter-Memorial, supra note 20, at ( 80.
72. Avena Counter Memorial, supra note 20, at 16.67-6.100.
73. LaGrand Judgment, supra note 19, at 91 87-91. Just how the United States must
change its laws to comply with the Vienna Convention is now the subject of the current
proceedings brought by Mexico. See Breard Provisional Order, supra note 65, at [1 7-8
(describing Mexico's request for judgment ordering repeal or removal of doctrineof procedural
default set forth by AEDPA habeas statute).
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B. The Last-in-Time Rule
If, as the previous discussion suggests, conflicts between a treaty and domestic law
are more likely to occur in the near future, federal and state courts must make two
determinations. First, a court must determine whether the treaty in question is "self-
executing" 74 as a matter of domestic law. As I will explain, beginning with Chief
Justice Marshall, federal courts have granted treaties "self-executing" or direct
domestic effect on the theory that treaties are equivalent to federal legislations.
Second, once a treaty is found to be self-executing, the court must determine the
relationship between the treaty and the form of domestic law (e.g. constitutional,
federal, or state) with which it comes into conflict. With respect to this question,
although their rationale has not been entirely consistent, courts have uniformly applied
the last-in-time rule to govern conflicts between treaties and federal statutes.
1. Self-Execution
Under British law, at the time of the Constitution, most treaties lacked domestic
effect until an act of Parliament was passed to implement that treaty's provisions.7 5 But
the Constitution, which declared treaties to be part of the "supreme Law of the Land,"
appears to create a different rule.76 The Supreme Court did not squarely consider the
question of self-execution until 1829 when Chief Justice Marshall endorsed the
principle of giving some treaties self-executing status as enforceable domestic law.
77
Although this decision held that the treaty in question was not self-executing, Foster
established that in order for a treaty "to be the law of the land" and "consequently, to
be regarded in courts of justice as equivalent to an act of the legislature, ...." the treaty
must "operate[] of itself without the aid of any legislative provision.'
8
Marshall's opinion has been widely cited for establishing the self-execution of at
least some treaties. Courts today have continued to find treaties self-executing.
79
74. What self-execution means is itself the subject of some debate. For my purposes,
self-execution refers to the judicial enforceability of treaties. For an influential discussion of the
different meanings of self-execution, see Carlos M. Vazquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-
Executing Treaties, 89 Am. J. INT'L L. 695, 697-700 (1995). The concept of self-execution is
considered an American innovation, which has been adopted, to varying degrees, by other
countries. See Yuji Iwasawa, The Doctrine of Self-Executing Treaties in the United States, 26
VA. J. INT'L L. 627 (1986); Albert Bleckmann, Self-Executing Treaties, 7 ENCYC. OF PUB. INT'L
L. 414 (R. Bernhardt ed., 1984).
75. Although some scholars have questioned this understanding of British law, see, for
example, Flaherty, supra note 6, at 2108-09, many influential American lawyers believed this to
be the case. See 1 JAMEs KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 155 (Da Capo Press 1971)
(1826).
76. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
77. Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829).
78. Id. at 314.
79. See, e.g., In re Comm'rs Subpoenas, 325 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding
extradition treaty with Canada self-executing); Cheung v. United States, 213 F.2d 82, 94 (2d
Cir. 2000); Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co. (America), 643 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1981); cf. Ogbudimkpa v.




Marshall did not, however, resolve all of the questions about the status of treaties in
domestic law. Indeed, courts and scholars have continued to wrestle with questions
such as how to determine whether a treaty is self-executingg° and whether there are any
constitutional limitations preventing treaties from being found self-executing. 81
Additionally, because Marshall's opinion does stand for the proposition that, at least in
some cases, treaties are enforceable as domestic law, it created the possibility that
treaties will come into direct conflict with domestic law.
Although Foster did not directly address this latter question of the relative priority
of treaties and domestic law, its formulation does provide some guidance. According to
Marshall, treaties were (at least in some cases) "equivalent to an act of the
legislature. 8 He did not equate treaties with either the common law or the natural law.
Rather, he emphasized that, for domestic law purposes, treaties are merely equivalent
to a law enacted by a legislature. As I will explain, this understanding of the status of
treaties is an important reason for applying the last-in-time rule to treaties and federal
statutes.
2. Treaties and Conflict with Domestic Law
Although a treaty is "equivalent to an act of legislature," Foster did not address how
treaties would interact with the three main forms of domestic law in the United States:
state law, constitutional law, and federal law. Courts faced with a conflict between a
treaty and a state law generally will give effect to the treaty (if it is self-executing),83
whereas courts faced with a conflict between a treaty and the Constitution generally
will give effect to the Constitution.
84
Both rules presume the superiority of one form of law over the other. But when
conflict occurs between a treaty and a federal statute, the courts apply the last-in-time
rule, which holds that "a treaty may supersede a prior act of Congress and an act of
80. Perhaps the most "confounding" question has to do with how to determine whether
a treaty is self-executing. United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 876 (5th Cir. 1979). While
many point to the intention of the United States, some argue that the intention of all of the
parties to a treaty should determine this question. Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 111, cmt. h (1987) ("intention of the United States
determines whether an agreement is to be self-executing.. ."), with David Sloss, Non-Self-
Executing Treaties: Exposing a Constitutional Fallacy, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1,45-55 (2002)
(rejecting intent approach).
81. Professor John Yoo has single-handedly initiated a debate on whether treaties
dealing with subject matters within the scope of Congress's Article I powers can ever be self-
executing. See Yoo, Globalism, supra note 6, at 1955; Vazquez, supra note 6, at 2189-92.
82. Foster, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 314.
83. This subordination of state law to treaties has never been seriously disputed. Ware
v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 237 (1796) ("[Elvery treaty made, by the authority of the United
States, shall be superior to the Constitution and laws of any individual State.").
84. No court has seriously considered using a treaty to override a constitutional
provision. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16 (1957) ("Of course.., no agreement with a foreign
nation can confer power on the Congress, or on any other branch of Government, which is free
from the restraints of the Constitution."). But the historical origins for this rule are actually far
from clear. See discussion infra Part IV.B.5.a (reviewing Patrick Henry's objections to treaty
clause of the Constitution).
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Congress may supersede a prior treaty. ' 5 The simplicity of this rule, however, belies
its somewhat complicated judicial origins and the courts' differing justifications for its
use.
a. Judicial Origins
The first judicial articulation of the last-in-time rule occurred in Taylor v. Morton,8 6
a case decided by Justice Benjamin Curtis sitting in circuit. Plaintiffs challenged a
congressional statute imposing duties on their importation of hemp on the grounds that
the statute violated certain treaty obligations.
8 7
Justice Curtis assumed that this treaty was self-executing and squarely faced the
question of a direct conflict between an act of Congress and a treaty. Although Justice
Curtis agreed with Marshall that a "treaty is part of the municipal law," he did not fully
embrace Marshall's view that a treaty is "equivalent to an act of the legislature."
Rather, Justice Curtis assumed that nothing in the Constitution resolves the relative
priority of treaties and federal statutes. Instead, he reasoned that, as a functional matter,
the Constitution must grant some part of the United States government the authority to
repeal a treaty. To hold otherwise, he argued, would leave the country in a "helpless
position."88 Because the power to repeal a treaty must exist, and the treaty-makers--the
President and two-thirds of the Senate-would need consent from their treaty partners
to withdraw from a treaty, Justice Curtis reasoned that Congress must have the
sovereign power to repeal a treaty's domestic effects. He did not reach the question of
whether a treaty could likewise repeal a federal statute.
Thus, Justice Curtis' "sovereignty" rationale for the last-in-time rule did not rely on
the equality of treaties and federal statutes and left open the possibility that federal
statutes could trump later in time treaties. Although it is widely cited as the origin of
the last-in-time rule, it is worth emphasizing that the Supreme Court did not completely
adopt the Taylor sovereignty rationale when it adopted the last-in-time rule. Instead,
the Court followed Marshall's formulation in Foster more closely and based its holding
on the equality rationale:
By the Constitution a treaty is placed on the same footing, and made of like
obligation, with an act of legislation. Both are declared by that instrument to be
the supreme law of the land, and no superior efficacy is given to either over the
other .... [I]f the two are inconsistent, the one last in date will control the
other[.189
Because a treaty is equivalent to an act of legislation, "a treaty may supersede a
prior act of Congress, and an act of Congress may supersede a prior treaty."
9
85. Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 616, 621 (187 1).
86. 23 F. Cas. 784 (C.C.D. Mass. 1855).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 786.
89. Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190 (1888) (emphasis added)
90. Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. at 621; see also Edye v. Robertson (Head Money
Cases), 112 U.S. 580, 597-600 (1884) ("A treaty, then, is a law of the land as an act of
Congress is, whenever its provisions prescribe a rule by which the rights of the private citizen or
20051
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This equality rationale differs from Taylor's sovereignty rationale in two important
respects. First, the basis for the last-in-time rule rests solely on the equivalency of
treaties and federal statutes and the understanding that treaties could repeal federal
statutes. Second, the Supreme Court's approach did not rest on Taylor's theory that the
power to break treaties must lie somewhere in the federal government. Rather, the
Court simply limited its holding to treaties' status in domestic law as "equivalent to an
act of legislature." As such, it was completely logical to apply the traditional rule for
resolving conflicts between two acts of legislature: the last-in-time rule. This reasoning
was further confirmed by Chan Chae Ping v. United States, where the Court explained
that "[i]f the treaty operates by its own force, and relates to a subject within the power
of Congress, it can be deemed in that particular only the equivalent of a legislative act.
,,91
The Court in Whitney and Chan Chae Ping did explicitly endorse one aspect of
Taylor's reasoning. Even if the statute overrides the treaty in violation of broad
international law principles, such as in contravention of withdrawal provisions in the
treaty itself, "those are not matters for judicial cognizance." 92 Rather, a complaining
country must direct its demands to the political branches of the federal government.
This is not, however, a full endorsement of Taylor's reasoning for the existence of the
rule in the first place that Congress must hold the sovereign authority to repeal treaties.
For this reason, it is the equality rationale, which extends the approach adopted by
Marshall with respect to self-execution, that has served as the chief basis for the last-in-
time rule. As I explain below, Justice Curtis' analysis has served as an attractive target
for many critics of the last-in-time rule while the equality rationale has been largely
untouched. Yet most court decisions applying the last-in-time rule for resolving
conflicts between treaties and federal statutes have relied on the Whitney equality
rationale. 93 As a matter of judicial precedent, therefore, the last-in-time rule rests more
on the Marshall equality rationale than the Curtis sovereignty rationale.
94
b. Application of the Last-in-Time Rule
Whatever its rationale, the last-in-time rule has been applied in a wide variety of
contexts. It has often been used to resolve conflicts between treaties and Congress'
exercise of its powers over foreign immigration and commerce.95 In the modem era,
treaties and statutes have come into conflict in new ways. For instance, tax treaties
subject may be determined. And when such rights are of a nature to be enforced in a court of
justice, that court resorts to the treaty for a rule of decision for the case before it as it would to a
statute.").
91. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 600-01 (1889).
92. Whitney, 124 U.S. at 194-95.
93. See, e.g., Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 18 (1957) ("an Act of Congress... is on afull
parity with a treaty."); Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 118-20 (1933) (citing Whitney in
holding that a treaty superseded prior statutes).
94. It rests on somewhat less solid footing among executive practice, but after some
early concerns, no member of the executive branch has seriously challenged the applicability of
the rule. See, e.g., 5Op. Att'y Gen. 334, 345-46 (1851); 6 Op. Att'y Gen. 658, 661-65 (1854).
95. See, e.g., Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 600-01 (conflict between treaty and




have caused numerous conflicts with the ever growing and complex Internal Revenue
Code.96 Although Congress had previously suspended the application of the last-in-
time rule to much of the code, 97 in 1988 Congress made it clear that the last-in-time
rule should be applied to all conflicts between tax treaties and the Internal Revenue
Code. 98 This has sparked complaints from abroad. Several European countries have
officially protested the application of the rule to override their nationals' tax treaty
rights.99
In recent years, the last-in-time rule has also been invoked by courts seeking to
resolve conflicts between domestic law and U.S. treaty obligations to international
institutions. International institutions, for instance, may be authorized to issue binding
interpretations of U.S. treaty obligations. In such circumstances, courts will enforce
federal law enacted later in time to the treaty's ratification.
For instance, in 1972, the D.C. Circuit cited the last-in-time rule as the basis for
enforcing the "Byrd" Amendment, even though that statute apparently violated United
Nations Security Council resolutions requiring member countries to boycott
Rhodesia.
1°°
More recently, the Supreme Court cited the last-in-time rule in the aforementioned
dispute with the International Court of Justice over the application of the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations. In the first of these cases, Paraguay had won a
provisional order from the I.C.J. ordering the suspension of an execution of a
Paraguayan national until the I.C.J. could rule on the merits. Both Paraguay and the
individual facing execution petitioned the Supreme Court for relief arguing that the
violations of the Vienna Convention should be given consideration in a habeas
proceeding challenging the conviction or the death sentence.10'
96. For a discussion of conflicts between the tax code and tax treaties, see Richard L.
Doernberg, Legislative Overrides of Income Tax Treaties: The Branch Profits Tax and
Congressional Arrogation of Authority, 42 TAx LAW. 173 (1989); David Sachs, Is the 1 91h
Century Doctrine of Treaty Override Good Law for Modern Day Tax Treaties? 47 TAX LAW.
867 (1994).
97. I.R.C. § 894(a) (West 2002). See discussion infra Part V.B. 1.
98. Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647,
§ 1012(aa)(1), 102 Stat. 3342, 3531 (1988) (codified in I.R.C. § 7852(d)) [hereinafter TAMRA];
see also TAMRA § 6139, 102 Stat. at 3724; TAMRA § 1012(aa)(2-3), 102 Stat. at 3531-33.
99. See, e.g., OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs, Report on Tax Treaty Overrides
(1989), reprinted in 2 TAX NoTEs INT'L 25 (1990); David Brockway, Commentary, 9 AM. J. TAx
POL'Y 95, 96 (1991) (stating pro-override view); Kathleen Matthews, Treaty Overrides: The
View from Congress, 39 TAx NoTES 422 (Apr. 25, 1988); Letter from Emmanuel de Margerie,
France's Ambassador to the United States, to James A. Baker II, United States Treasury
Secretary (July 16, 1987), reprinted in EEC Group of Six Addresses 1986Act's Treaty Override
Provisions, 36 TAX NoTs 437 (1987).
100. Diggs v. Shultz, 470 F.2d 461 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (refusing to override statute that
violated U.N. Security Council resolution ordering boycott of Rhodesia); see also S. REp. No.
92-359, at 121 (1971) (Byrd Amendment); S.C. Res. 232, U.N. SCOR, 2nd Sess., 1340th mtg.,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/32 (1966).
101. Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998).
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The Supreme Court rejected both petitions. Primarily, it adopted an interpretation of
the Vienna Convention that did not conflict with federal laws governing habeas corpus
proceedings and that was later rejected by the I.C.J. in LaGrand and Avena.I12
Alternatively, the opinion noted that even if the treaty did, as petitioners insisted,
conflict with federal habeas law, the last-in-time rule would prevent the Court from
giving effect to the treaty. The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act was
enacted in 1996 while the Vienna Convention was ratified in 1969. Hence, "Breard's
ability to obtain relief based on violations of the Vienna Convention is subject to this
subsequently enacted rule .... 103
This case illustrates how the last-in-time rule could affect the interaction between
the United States and an international institution issuing binding interpretations of U.S.
treaty obligations. In this situation, an international institution adopted a binding
interpretation of a treaty obligation that conflicted with domestic laws governing
criminal punishment and post-conviction review. The Supreme Court adopted a narrow
interpretation of the treaty but also pointed out that the treaty was subject to a later-in-
time statute."
The last-in-time rule thus operated as a final bar preventing the international
institution's interpretation of U.S. treaty obligations from taking effect within the
domestic legal system. As international institutions become more prominent and
important in the interpretation of U.S. treaty obligations, it is likely that this last in time
bar will be more commonly applied.
Of course, the last-in-time rule does not affect treaties that supersede state laws nor
does it protect treaties from constitutional challenges. But it remains a decisive rule for
treaties for at least two reasons. First, the broad scope of the federal lawmaking power
means that there are very few areas of state law that federal law cannot regulate.
Hence, most conflicts with state law will also conflict with federal statutory law.
Second, the possibility of enacting a federal statute repealing or modifying a treaty's
effect in the domestic system is significant because it lessens the necessity for applying
constitutional scrutiny to treaties. For instance, questions about the constitutionality of
delegations to international institutions such as the United Nations Security Council or
the International Court of Justice can be assuaged by the realization that the ultimate
control over the treaty's domestic effect lies with Congress. 0 5 Perhaps for this reason,
U.S. policymakers have taken some comfort in the rule. Senator Jesse Helms, the
former chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, observed in a speech to
102. Thus, the Court reasoned that "[bly not asserting his Vienna Convention claim in
state court, Breard failed to exercise his rights under the Vienna Convention in conformity with
the laws of the United States and the Commonwealth of Virginia. Having failed to do so, he
cannot raise a claim of violation of those rights now on federal habeas review." Id. at 375-76;
see also Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.) (Final Judgment
of 31 March 2004).
103. Id. at 376. The Supreme Court may revisit this holding this Term in light of
LaGrand and Avena. See Medellin v. Dretke, 125 S.Ct. 686 (2004).
104. Breard, 523 U.S. 371.
105. See Ku, supra note 18, at 93-104. Of course, this does not mean that I am
abandoning my claim that courts should impose ajudicially enforceable non-delegation doctrine
on international delegations. See id. at 121-45. Rather, I am simply observing that without the
last-in-time rule, the delegation concern would be even greater. '
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the U.N. Security Council that (to his apparent satisfaction) U.S. treaty obligations can
be superseded by a simple act of Congress.'06
C. Summary
The development of a new international law, regulating a nation's relations to its
own nationals and administered by international institutions, raises the likelihood of
conflict between treaties and domestic law, With respect to state law and constitutional
law, such conflicts will be resolved by choosing constitutional law over treaties but
treaties over state laws. When a conflict occurs with federal law, however, courts will
apply the last-in-time rule on the theory that treaties and federal statutes are equivalent
forms of law. The importance of this equality rationale, which has formed the basis for
judicial application of the last-in-time rule, has been obscured by a separate
sovereignty rationale endorsed by an influential circuit court opinion.
Whatever its rationale, because of the broad scope of modern federal law, the
interaction of treaties and federal law is likely to constitute the main front in a growing
number of collisions between treaties and domestic law. Indeed, the last-in-time rule
has already been invoked to limit the effect of an international institution's
interpretation of a treaty that would have affected domestic laws governing criminal
punishment. Moreover, even the possibility that Congress can overrule the domestic
effect of a treaty or an international institution's interpretation of a treaty obligation
can have an important effect on treaty makers and the interpretation of treaties. For
these reasons, it is fair to say that as treaties become more important for the domestic
law system, so will the last-in-time rule.
II. TREATIES AS LAWS-A CONCEPTUAL DIVIDE
In this Part, I consider the two main conceptions of the status of treaties within the
domestic legal system. The "internationalist conception" generally holds that treaties
should have presumptive enforceability as a matter of domestic law and that treaties
should supersede inconsistent federal and state law irrespective of many traditional
constitutional limitations. In contrast, the "revisionist" approach sees a more limited
role for treaties with respect to federal and state law, one that is also subject to strict
constitutional limitations. The last-in-time rule does not fit comfortably within either
the internationalist or revisionist conception. For this reason, proponents of both sides
have argued for discarding the last-in-time rule as a mechanism for resolving conflicts
between treaties and federal statutes.
A. The Internationalist Conception
A number of prominent and influential legal scholars take the position that treaties,
and international law more generally, should have as much domestic legal effect within
106. Senator Jesse Helms, Address before the United Nations Security Council (Jan. 20,
2000), discussed in Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to
International Law, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 348, 350-54 (2000).
20051
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
the United States as possible. Dubbed the "internationalist conception, ' ' 17 it is
comprised of two substantive components.
First, internationalists believe that treaties and other kinds of international law
should be presumptively incorporated as domestic law. This means, in the context of
treaties, that treaties should be presumed self-executing and that attempts by the treaty
makers or courts to declare treaties non-self-executing should be strictly limited or
prohibited.' 0 8
Second, internationalists believe that treaties should be supreme to all domestic law,
including federal law,' 9 and perhaps even constitutional law.' 10 Moreover,
internationalists have generally rejected most federalism limitations on the treaty
power."' As a result, the internationalist conception generally considers treaties
supreme to federal as well as state law irrespective of whether the federal statute was
passed later in time to the treaty's ratification or whether the state law would otherwise
fall within the protection of the Tenth Amendment." 12 For this reason, as I will explain
in Part IM.C, many internationalists have called for the abandonment of the last-in-time
rule.
To be sure, labeling scholars as internationalists fails to capture the nuances in their
specific views on many of these questions. This term, however, usefully captures a
general orientation to the incorporation of treaties and international law shared by
many, if not most, American scholars of international law."
3
107. See Curtis A. Bradley, Breard, Our Dualist Constitution, and the Internationalist
Conception, 51 STAN. L. REv. 529, 539-57 (1999) (outlining elements of "internationalist
conception"); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts and the Incorporation of
Customary International Law, 111 HARv. L. REv. 2260, 2274-75 (1998) (describing an
"internationalist assumption" that international law must be part of domestic law).
108. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES. § 11l, n.5 (1987) (stating there is a "strong presumption that a treaty has been
considered self-executing" if no presidential or congressional action taken); HENKiN, supra note
28, at 201-04; Jordan J. Paust, Self Executing Treaties, 82 Al. J. INT'L L. 760, 775 (1988).
109. See Henkin, supra note 5, at 871-72; Jordan J. Paust, Rediscovering the
Relationship Between Congressional Power and International Law: Exceptions to the Last-in-
time rule and the Primacy of Custom, 28 VA. J. INT'L L. 393, 398-414 (1988).
110. See Spiro, supra note 4, at 2017-27.
111. See, e.g., HENKIN, supra note 28, at 189-93; Lori F. Damrosch, The Role of the
United States Senate Concerning Self Executing Treaties, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 515, 530-31
(1991); Gerald L. Neuman, The Global Dimensions of RFRA, 14 CONST. COMM. 33,34 (1997).
112. For instance, the Supreme Court has ruled that the federal government cannot
regulate certain subjects through its Article I commerce clause power. See, e.g., United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); Lopez v. United States, 514 U.S. 549 (1997). Some
internationalist lawyers and scholars have nonetheless argued that these same subjects could be
regulated under the treaty power. See, e.g., Brief Amici Curiae on Behalf of International Law
Scholars and Human Rights Experts in Support of Petitioners, United States v. Morrison, 529
U.S. 598 (2000) (Nos. 99-5, 99-0029).
113. The views of Louis Henkin, the author of the leading treatise on foreign relations
law and the Chief Reporter of the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the
United States, encapsulate most of the internationalist conception. The abiding influence of
Henkin and the Restatement (Third) on both his disciples and his critics is hard to overstate. See
Paul Stephan, Courts, the Constitution, and Customary International Law: The Intellectual
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B. A Revisionist View - The New Sovereigntism?
In recent years, the internationalist conception has come under criticism within the
academy from a group of scholars often referred to as revisionists. Defined broadly,
revisionism has been described as "challenges-sometimes novel ones-to conventional
thinking."' 14 In the context of foreign relations law, the term "revisionist" was probably
initiated by a 1997 Harvard Law Review article challenging internationalist
conceptions of the status of customary international law within the domestic system."
5
Subsequent articles critiquing other components of the internationalist conception have
established a revisionist framework for analyzing the status of international law within
the domestic system. This framework has two main components.
First, revisionists have argued that international law, whether it takes the form of
customary or treaty law, should be subject to the same constitutional limitations and
requirements that are imposed on other forms of domestic law. For example, in the
context of treaty law, revisionists have argued that treaties should be limited by the
Tenth Amendment to the same degree as federal law. 16
Second, revisionists have argued that international law, especially treaties, should
have very limited domestic effect. For example, revisionists have argued that the
Senate may impose unilateral conditions limiting or nullifying the domestic effect of
treaties."' Others have gone further, claiming that most treaties have no self-executing
effect if their subject matter falls within Congress's Article I legislative powers." 8
The revisionist conception extends beyond the issue of incorporation of treaties and
international law into the domestic system." 9 Professor Spiro has attributed to these
Origins of the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, 44 VA. J.
INT'LL 33 (2003).
114. Michael D. Ramsey, Textbook Revisionism, 43 VA. J. INT'L L. 1111, 1113 (2003)
(reviewing CURTIs A. BRADLEY & JACK L. GOLDSMrH, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS (2002)).
115. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 7, at 849-70. The term was first used by
their critics. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Bringing International Law Home, 35 Hous. L. REv.
623, 666-67 (1998) (stating that the Bradley and Goldsmith "revisionist arguments have been
almost universally criticized"). The term has also been used to describe Professor John Yoo's
criticism of internationalist conceptions of self-execution. See Flaherty, supra note 6, at 2096-
97 (referring to Professor Yoo's position in the "revisionist" vanguard); Vazquez, supra note 6,
at 2203 (describing Yoo as part of "a small group of scholars who have embarked on the project
of unsettling what had previously been thought to be settled in the area of foreign affairs law").
116. See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 4, at 433-50 (arguing for limited conception of
treaty power's scope of authority over state law).
117. See, e.g., Bradley and Goldsmith, supra note 6, at 456-68.
118. See, e.g., Yoo, Treaties, supra note 6, at 2091-94 (arguing that original
understanding prohibited self-executing treaties within scope of Congress's Article I powers).
119. For instance, scholars have challenged existing conceptions of the President's
power over foreign affairs and war powers and the role of states in foreign relations. See, e.g.,
Saikrishna Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power Over Foreign Affairs, 111
YALE L. J. 231, 233-65 (2001) (arguing that all U.S. foreign affairs powers are held by the
President if not otherwise assigned to Congress); Ku, supra note 62, at 527-30 (arguing states
have substantial role in foreign relations and compliance with international law); Michael D.
Ramsey, The Power of the States in Foreign Affairs: The Original Understanding of Foreign
Policy Federalism, 75 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 341, 369-90 (1999) (arguing that there are no
implied limitations on state activity in foreign affairs); John C. Yoo, Clio at War: The Misuse of
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scholars a normative view about the nature of international law, referring to them as the
"New Sovereigntists."'120 Indeed, as I have argued previously, the term "revisionist" is
a fairer characterization of this group of scholars because much of their work is
focused on revising or critiquing the prevailing internationalist conception of
international law rather than advancing a particular pro-sovereignty ideology.12'
C. Internationalists, Revisionists, and the Last-in-Time Rule
Although the last-in-time rule lies at the heart of potential conflicts between treaties
and domestic law, it does not fit comfortably into either of the two conceptions.
1. Internationalists and the Last-in-Time rule
The last-in-time rule assumes that treaties are, at least in some circumstances,
domestic law on par with federal law. In this way, the existence of the last-in-time rule
supports the incorporation of treaties into domestic law and at least the first component
of the internationalist conception.
However, the last-in-time rule also authorizes Congress to nullify the domestic
effect of an otherwise valid treaty. This troubles internationalists for at least two
reasons. First, it challenges internationalist claims for the supremacy of international
law, including treaties, over all forms of domestic law. Second, the existence of the
last-in-time rule also suggests that Congress has the power to unilaterally declare a
treaty non-self-executing for purposes of domestic law.122 This means that even though
the last-in-time rule supports finding most treaties self-executing, it also suggests that
self-execution can be cancelled by an unilateral act of Congress.
For these reasons, it is hardly surprising that internationalist scholars have long
called for the last-in-time rule to be reconsidered or discarded. 23 Their case against the
last-in-time rule rests on both textual and historical considerations, but also contains a
functional component. A globalizing world characterized by international cooperation
requires the United States to avoid doctrines that encourage or even invite violations of
its international obligations, As Professor Henkin declares:
Other free countries increasingly have subordinated domestic institutions and
parochial ways to help achieve greater effect for agreed international norms. Now
is hardly the time for the United States, aspiring to lead the struggle for the rule of
History in the War Powers Debate, 70 U. COLO. L. REv. 1169 (1999) (criticizing use of
historical sources to support congressional control over war powers).
120. See Peter J. Spiro, The New Sovereigntists, FOREIGN AFF., Nov.-Dec. 2000, at 9;
Peter J. Spiro, Globalization and the (Foreign Affairs) Constitution, 63 OHIO ST. L. J. 649,653-
55 n.16 (2002).
121. See Ku, supra note 62, at 470 n.63. Indeed, so-called "New Sovereigntists" have
rejected the characterization, or at least the connotations the term creates, about their substantive
policy views. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Letter to the Editor, FOREIGN AFF.,
Mar.-Apr. 2001, at 188-89 (arguing that it "is not a rejection of international law ... to
examine whether treaties or customary international rules are consistent with U.S. interests and
constitutional standards, or to consider how these international norms should best be
implemented within the U.S. system.").
122. See Vazquez, supra note 6, at 2174-75.
123. See, e.g., Henkin, supra note 5, at 869-72; Paust, supra note 109, at 398-416.
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law in a disorderly world, to retreat further into unilateralism by distorting our
jurisprudence and encouraging our institutions to pay less, rather than more,
respect to the law of nations. 1
24
2. Revisionists and the Last-in-Time Rule
The internationalist criticisms of the last-in-time rule do not, oddly enough, mean
that revisionists will necessarily embrace the rule. While the last-in-time rule
guarantees Congress the power to override the domestic effect of a treaty, it also holds
that a treaty can repeal an otherwise valid federal statute. This result has led at least
one leading revisionist scholar, Professor John Yoo, to reject the last-in-time rule as
well. 
25
For Professor Yoo, the problem with the last-in-time rule is not so much with the
rule itself, but with its implications for his broader conception of treaties. Not only has
he argued against the internationalist presumption of self-execution for treaties, hut he
has further argued that the original understanding of the Constitution prohibited any
self-executing treaties from coming into conflict with legislation enacted by Congress
pursuant to its Article I powers.
126
Although he concedes that judicial precedent has not conformed to this
understanding, he nevertheless maintains that, at the very least, courts should adopt a
"clear statement" rule "that treaties are non-self-executing unless the treaty makers
openly declare otherwise."' 2 7 The rationale for adopting a clear statement rule would
be to avoid constitutional difficulties created by regulating matters within the scope of
Article I and thus, conflicting directly with federal statutes. 28
This conception of treaties nearly eliminates the domestic legal effect of treaties
reflecting the new international law, which is concerned with the relations between a
state and its own citizens in the context of human rights, commercial law, family law,
and other issues. 129 Under existing Supreme Court precedent, these matters almost
certainly fall within Congress's existing Article I powers.' 30 Therefore, treaties
implementing obligations under the "new" international law, could not become an
independent mechanism for domestic lawmaking. In most cases, treaties would not be
"law" at all for domestic purposes.SI
Because Professor Yoo's analysis divides self-executing treaties and federal statutes
into essentially independent spheres, he cannot accept the existence of a last-in-time
rule that presumes an overlap between treaties and statutes. In his view, when a self-
124. Henkin, supra note 5, at 886.
125. Yoo, supra note 29, at 815-16.
126. See, e.g., Yoo, Globalism, supra note 6, at 1955; Yoo, Treaties, supra note 6, at
2233-57.
127. Yoo, Globalism, supra note 6, at 1955.
128. Yoo, Treaties, supra note 6, at 2256-57.
129. See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 11, at 105-06.
130. This can be reasonably inferred by the fact that the Supreme Court has only limited
federal legislative power twice in the past seventy years. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison,
529 U.S. 598 (2000); Lopez v. United States, 514 U.S. 549 (1997); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
131. See Vazquez, supra note 6, at 2189-92.
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executing treaty and statute conflict, a court should consider whether the treaty or the
statute has strayed beyond its field of delegated authority under either Article I or
Article II. Whether or not that treaty or statute is "last in time" cannot be relevant to his
analysis.
Therefore, the last-in-time rule would never be needed because, by definition,
treaties and Article I legislation should never come into conflict. If a treaty did attempt
to encroach on an Article I subject, Professor Yoo would support giving priority to the
Article I legislation. Indeed, he has explicitly argued that the last-in-time rule should be
rejected because no federal statute can be repealed by a treaty. 32
In this way, at least one revisionist conception of treaties also rejects the last-in-time
rule. From this perspective, however, the last-in-time rule gives too much domestic
effect to treaties rather than too little.'
33
D. Summary
This part has identified two approaches to analyzing treaties as domestic law. On
one side, internationalists generally support giving treaties domestic effect that
supersedes inconsistent federal and state law without any serious constitutional
limitations stemming from federalism or individual rights. On the other side, revisionist
scholars have sought to limit the domestic effect of treaties by allocating the power to
declare treaties non-self-executing to the treaty-making branches and by imposing
federalism and other constitutional constraints on the treaty power. In its most radical
form, the revisionist approach would prohibit treaties from having any domestic effect
within the scope of Congress's Article I powers, thereby making it nearly impossible
for treaties to implement most types of the "new international law."
In this way, the existence of the last-in-time rule poses difficulties for both
internationalists and revisionists. For internationalists like Professor Henkin, the last-
in-time rule reduces treaties to equal status with federal statutory law and subjects
treaties to the legislative whims of Congress. For revisionists like Professor Yoo, the
last-in-time rule suggests an impermissible confluence of treaties and federal statutory
law that undermines his broader conception of treaties as non-self-executing in almost
all circumstances. Because the existence of the last-in-time rule challenges both
132. Yoo, supra note 29, at 815-16.
133. Professor Akhil Amar has offered another view that reads treaties as superior to all
state law but subordinate to federal law. In his reading, federal law could repeal an earlier-in-
time treaty, but no treaty could repeal an earlier-in-time statute. See AKHiL AMAR, AMERICA'S
CONsrrrrioN: A BIOGRAPHY (forthcoming November 2005) (draft on file with the Indiana Law
Journal). This reading draws heavily on comments made during the Virginia Ratification
debates by Francis Corbin and in a post-ratification speech by James Wilson. See id. While
powerfully presented, I am nonetheless unconvinced that this understanding of the status of
treaties was widely shared during the Founding period given statements by Madison, Hamilton,
and Wolcott in opposition to this view. See discussion infra at text accompanying note 287
(Madison), note 345 (Hamilton), and note 331 (Wolcott). Still, Amar's discussion does
reinforce my conclusion that the historical evidence in favor of the internationalist view is weak,




conceptions of the role of treaties in the domestic legal system, it is not surprising that
the rule has been rejected by both sides of this conceptual divide.
III. A TEXTUAL AND STRUCTURAL DEFENSE
Although the last-in-time rule has important implications for the domestic effect of
treaty law, it rests on shaky foundations, at least within the legal academy. Both
internationalist and revisionist scholars have argued that the last-in-time rule is
inconsistent with the text and structure of the Constitution, especially as understood at
the time the Constitution was drafted and ratified. Given the strength of these
criticisms, it is somewhat surprising that courts generally do not even bother to offer
textual or structural justifications for their application of the rule. 134
This Part provides the missing textual and structural basis for the rule. With respect
to text, the Constitution's designation of treaties as "Law" for domestic purposes
should be understood to subject treaties to the background rule for resolving conflicts
between different forms of law: the last-in-time rule. With respect to structure, the
Constitution's structure assumes overlap and conflict between the forms of law created
by different lawmaking institutions. The courts, and not the original lawmaking
mechanisms themselves, are responsible under the constitutional structure for resolving
such conflicts.
A. Text
The main source for analyzing the textual propriety of the last-in-time rule is the
Supremacy Clause, which reads:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.'
35
At the very least, this section establishes that three forms of law-constitutional law,
the "Laws of the United States," and treaties-are the "supreme Law of the Land."
This "supreme Law" binds "the Judges in every State" regardless of state law
(including state constitutional law). The inferiority of state law is likely established by
the phrase "supreme Law" rather than by the "Judges in every State" clause.' 36 The last
clause is probably best understood as a rule of construction for state courts when
interpreting state and federal law.'
37
134. See, e.g., Chae Pan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581,600-01 (1889); Taylorv.
Morton, 23 F. Cas. 784 (C.C.D. Mass. 1855).
135. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.2.
136. See Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 245 n.60 (2000). Otherwise,




1. The Textual Critique
Critics of the last-in-time rule have argued, however, that the mere fact that
constitutional law, federal law, and treaties are all designated "supreme Law" does not
establish any hierarchy between these three kinds of law within the U.S. system.
38
After all, an assumption of equality between the various forms of law recognized by the
Supremacy Clause would subject constitutional law to the last-in-time rule as well.' 3
9
But this cannot be the right result because, "in our jurisprudence, the Constitution
prevails over other federal law.
'14°
This criticism echoes the analysis of the last-in-time rule provided in Taylor v.
Morton. In that case, Justice Curtis rejected a textual justification for the last-in-time
rule on similar grounds, suggesting that the constitutional text offers no guidance for
resolving a conflict between a treaty and a federal statute.' 4 1 Instead, he advanced a
"sovereignty" rationale which depends on the assumption that Congress must hold the
sovereign authority to violate a treaty.
Buttressed by such admissions that the constitutional text does not require the last-
in-time rule, critics of the rule like Professor Henkin have been able to assume that the
text of the Supremacy Clause does not support the last-in-time rule. 142 Instead of
looking at the text, internationalist scholars have suggested that determining the
relative priority of the different forms of law recognized in the Supremacy Clause
flows from the nature and importance of those different forms of law.' 43 Indeed, if the
necessity of a sovereign power to repeal treaties lies at the heart of the last-in-time rule,
internationalist scholars can directly challenge this rationale on the theory that modem
international law, especially the kind of international law devised by multilateral treaty,
should no longer be subject to the whims of a sovereign legislature given that other
countries have rejected the U.S. approach. As the Restatement (Third) of Foreign
Relations Law notes:
[l]t has been urged that the .. . [last-in-time rule] should not apply to
inconsistency between a statute and general international law established by
general multilateral treaty. For that case at least there have been suggestions that
the United States might better adopt the jurisprudence of some European
countries, which gives effect to an international agreement even in the face of
subsequent legislation.'44
In other words, as in many European countries, the new importance of international
law ought to confer on it greater status in domestic U.S. law than the last-in-time rule
currently provides.
138. E.g., Henkin, supra note 5, at 871-72.
139. See id.
140. Id.
141.23 F. Cas. 784 (C.C.D. Mass. 1855), affid on other grounds, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 481
(1862); see supra text accompanying notes 86-94.
142. Henkin, supra note 5, at 871-72.
143. See, e.g., id.; Paust, supra note 111, at 398-414.




2. A Textual Defense
a. Why Have a Supremacy Clause?
Before conceding to Professor Henkin and Justice Curtis that the Supremacy Clause
provides no guidance to resolving the relative priority of statutory and treaty law,
however, it is worth thinking about why the Supremacy Clause is needed in the first
place. If the relative priority of the various forms of law, say state law versus federal
law, could be determined by the nature of those forms of law rather than by textual
instructions in the Constitution, there would be no need for the Supremacy Clause.
For instance, if, as internationalist critics have argued, it is the nature of treaties as
international law that gives them superior status to federal law, then it seems equally
plausible that the nature of treaties gives them superior status to state law. But if the
Constitution had intended to leave the question of determining the relative hierarchy of
different types of law to the inherent nature of those laws, the Supremacy Clause would
appear to be completely superfluous. Indeed, as I will argue in Part IV, internationalist
critics have offered no serious historical explanation for why the Constitution's drafters
felt it necessary to declare that treaties were supreme to state law but felt no such need
with respect to treaties over federal statutes.
In fact, the drafters of the Constitution obviously felt that some textual declaration
was needed to subordinate state law to the Constitution, treaties, and federal statutes.
The text of the Supremacy Clause plainly serves this purpose. But the inclusion of the
Supremacy Clause strongly suggests that in the absence of this clause all forms of law
designated by the Constitution, including state law, have no obvious priority to each
other. Were it not for state law's exclusion from the status of "supreme Law," state law
would stand on the same footing as the other forms of law. 145
The fact that state law, prior to its demotion in the Supremacy Clause, stands on
equal footing to the other forms of law indicates that the text of the Constitution
contained a background assumption about the relationship between various forms of
law. Imbued in modern conceptions of hierarchy between state and federal law, it is
sometimes hard to conceive of state and federal law holding equal status. But as
Professor Nelson has explained, state courts under the Articles of Confederation
treated all enacted law, including federal law and treaties, as equal rather than superior
to state law. 146 Courts sought to interpret state and federal laws to avoid conflict. But
when no such reconciliation could be made, courts would apply the standard rule of
statutory construction, the last-in-time rule, to resolve conflicts between enacted
federal and state laws. 1
47
The best understanding of the purpose of the Supremacy Clause, therefore, is to
exempt state law from the last-in-time rule. Its silence, however, about the relative
relationship of federal statutes and treaties suggests that the last in time assumption
remains in effect.
145. I draw this insight from Professor Nelson's important work. See Nelson, supra
note 136, at 245-46.




b. The Constitutional Law Exception
The main objection to this reading, of course, is that an assumption of equality
between the various forms of law recognized by the Supremacy Clause would subject
constitutional law to the last-in-time rule as well.' 48 But constitutional law, at least
since Marbury v. Madison, 14 9 is clearly not subject to the last-in-time rule. The lack of
textual support for the superiority of constitutional law suggests, say critics, that it is
the nature of constitutional law, rather than any instructions from the text, that makes it
superior to federal and state law. This means that the nature of treaty law, rather than
the text, makes it superior to federal statutory law.
This is a serious but not insurmountable objection. The most important textual
response relies on the use of the word "Constitution." As I will discuss below in Part
IV, the use of the word "Constitution" as opposed to "Articles of Confederation"
represents a fundamental shift in thinking about the law binding the various states
together, as Justice Marshall recognized in Marbury150 While the Articles of
Confederation served as a kind of treaty between the states,' 5' the use of the term
"Constitution" represents something quite different: an action by the "people" of the
different states to establish a fundamental law. 152 Indeed, as James Madison himself
argued, while a law violating a treaty might be enforced, a law "violating a constitution
established by the people themselves was null and void."'
5 3
But if the status of constitutional law as superior to all other forms of law, including
state law, was apparent from the very use of the term "Constitution," why include the
term in the Supremacy Clause at all? The likely explanation is that the Supremacy
Clause was still needed to establish the superiority of constitutional law to the only
other kind of law with a similar claim to popular sovereignty: state constitutional law.
With both types of law claiming a certain fundamental law status, the inclusion of the
Supremacy Clause within the Constitution serves to dispel any doubts about the
ultimate status of federal constitutional law.
In sum, critics have dismissed the text of the Supremacy Clause as a possible basis
for the last-in-time rule. But none of the critics have squarely faced the hard question:
if the nature of treaty law is understood to be supreme to all domestic law, why is the
Supremacy Clause needed at all? The answer is that the last-in-time rule operates to
resolve conflicts between different forms of law (except for constitutional law). The
purpose of the Supremacy Clause is to abolish the last-in-time rule with respect to state
law. By failing to add further textual instructions on the relative priority of federal and
treaty law, the text of the Constitution leaves in place the last-in-time rule for conflicts
between the remaining two forms of (non-constitutional) law.
148. See Henkin, supra note 5, at 867-70.
149. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
150. Id. at 176-80.
151. David Golove, The New Confederalism: Treaty Delegations of Legislative,
Executive, and Judicial Autonomy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1697, 1706-10 (2003) (reviewing the
historical conception of the Articles of Confederation as a treaty rather than a constitution).
152. For a discussion of the Founders' conception of higher law, see infra text
accompanying notes 177-81.




On a separate front, critics have also argued that the last-in-time rule is inconsistent
with the Constitution's structure. Specifically, the leading revisionist critic of the rule
has suggested that treaties cannot, under any circumstances, nullify the effect of a
federal statute.' 54 This structural criticism of the last-in-time rule is less widely shared,
but it amounts to a powerful objection to applying the rule.
1. The Structural Critique
The structural objection to the last-in-time rule rests heavily on a formalist approach
to analyzing the Constitution's structure, in particular its lawmaking structure. The
Constitution sets up three formal lawmaking mechanisms: legislation under Article I,
treaty-making under Article II, and constitution-amending under Article V. The
product of the formal lawmaking processes is recognized as "Law" (in the Supremacy
Clause) that is superior to state law. These same forms of law are recognized in Article
III as falling within the scope of the federal judicial power.
Each of these lawmaking processes, in theory, is limited by procedural and
substantive constraints. Substantive constraints impose subject matter limitations on
each lawmaking mechanism. Thus, Congress's Article I powers are limited to
delegated powers, such as its power to regulate interstate commerce. 5 5 Similarly, some
courts and commentators have suggested that the treaty power is limited to proper
matters of international negotiation.' 56 Even the constitution-amending power is
restrained, albeit in minor ways. 1
57
In addition to these substantive subject matter constraints, courts have recognized
procedural constraints on the lawmaking mechanisms. Thus, the Article I legislative
process requires bicameral presentment to both houses of Congress and approval by
the President to take effect.'5 8 Similarly, the President must seek the advice and
consent of the Senate prior to making any treaties.' 59 Finally, a constitutional
amendment must run the gauntlet of congressional and state legislative approval (or
approval by constitutional convention).' t
The Supreme Court has imposed a formalist approach to these procedural
requirements, at least with respect to Article I legislation. In INS v. Chadha161 and its
progeny, the Court rejected congressional attempts to create mechanisms such as the
154. Yoo, supra note 29, at 790-99.
155. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
156. See, e.g., Thomas Jefferson, Manual of Parliamentary Practice:for the Use of the
Senate of the United States, in JEFFERSON'S PARLIAMENTARY WRrTNGs 353, 420 (Wilber S.
Howell ed., 1988) (describing limitations on the treaty power to those "subjects usually
regulated by treaty"). For a detailed discussion of the history of the subject matter constraint on
the treaty power, see Bradley, supra note 4, at 419-22.
157. U.S. CONST. art. V (prohibiting any constitutional amendment banning slave trade
prior to 1808).
158. Id. at art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
159. Id. at art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
160. Id. at art. V.
161. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
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legislative or line-item veto because such mechanisms had the effect of repealing
legislation without full bicameral presentment as required by the Article I processes. 1
62
In other words, the Court has held that the full Article I procedure for legislation is the
exclusive mechanism for exercising Article I legislative powers.' 63 It has also held that
repealing a law enacted pursuant to Article I is indistinguishable from Article I
legislation and must comply with the same procedures.
14
The Court has not considered (nor has it had the opportunity to do so) whether
similar formalist strictures must be placed on the treaty power and the constitutional-
amending power. This has left room for some scholars, most notably Professors
Ackerman and Golove, to argue that neither of these procedures is exclusive and that
both treaties and constitutional amendments can be created through other procedural
mechanisms.165 Hence, in the context of treaties, they have claimed that treaties can be
replaced by a combination of executive agreements and congressional legislation
66
and that constitutional amendments may be replaced by a combination of influential
and authoritative judicial interpretations ratified by presidential elections.' 67 Although
enormously influential, this approach also has been vigorously criticized 168 and has not
been explicitly recognized or adopted by any court. 69 If one does not accept the
Ackerman-Golove conception, then, as Professor Yoo argues, the formalist approach
articulated by the Court in Chadha and its progeny remains the dominant
understanding of the Constitution's lawmaking structure.
170
A formalist approach to the procedural constraints governing the treaty power,
however, cuts against the last-in-time rule. If the Article I legislative process is the
exclusive mechanism for making and repealing Article I legislation, then, from a
formalist perspective, treaties cannot repeal Article I legislation, whether or not that
treaty was ratified later in time. To take the formalist analysis of procedural constraints
to its logical conclusion, Article II treaty-making should also be an exclusive
mechanism. This would prohibit later in time statutes enacted via Article I from
repealing Article II treaties.
In this way, the last-in-time rule appears inconsistent with a formalist approach to
constitutional structure. 171 Rather than focus on which form of law was created later in
time, a formalist approach would permit the repeal of a treaty or statute only using the
162. Id. at 951; Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417,438-41 (1998).
163. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 951.
164. Id. at 952.
165. See Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARV. L.
REv. 799, 811 (1995) (pointing out that the text does permit the inference that treaties are not
the exclusive means of creating international agreements).
166. Id.
167. Id. at 907-08.
168. E.g., Joel R. Paul, The Geopolitical Constitution: Executive Expediency and
Executive Agreements, 86 CAL. L. REv. 671 (1998); Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and
Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108
HARV. L. REv. 1221 (1995).
169. See Made in the U.S.A. Found. v. United States, 56 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1312-13
(N.D. Ala. 1999).
170. Yoo, supra note 29, at 789.
171. Id. at 815.
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same procedural mechanisms by which they were created. Thus, instead of choosing
which treaty was "last in time," a formalist approach to structure would look at the
mechanism creating each form of law and then consider whether that law or treaty fell
within the proper substantive borders. Alternatively, the formalist structure might
simply require, as in Chadha, the full use of the original lawmaking mechanism in
order to repeal either the treaty or the statute. Any attempt to modify a form of law by
use of an alternative mechanism-say using a treaty to repeal a statute-would not be
enforced by a court.
2. The Structural Defense
This line of attack on the last-in-time rule is not based solely on the Chadha
approach. The Court in Taylor v. Morton172 also recognized this argument and found it
so powerful that the Court resorted to an extra-constitutional theory to justify the rule.
But this resolution of the challenge posed by the Chadha formalist structure is hardly
satisfying. In fact, there are at least two arguments against imposing a formalist
separation of the various lawmaking functions.
First, the Constitution's creation of separate procedural mechanisms for making
treaties and statutes does not mean that the product of those mechanisms, mainly
treaties and statutes, will never overlap and collide. Rather, the absence of strict
substantive constraints on the various lawmaking powers makes such collision almost
inevitable. For instance, the Supremacy Clause itself is designed to resolve expected
conflicts between state law and the other three forms of law. But since all the powers
held by the federal government were delegated away from the states (except where
reserved), one might plausibly argue that these substantive constraints would preclude
any conflicts between federal and state law. Presumably, a formalist would argue that
Congress could not exercise powers it did not have (such as over intrastate commerce)
and the states could not exercise powers they did not have (such as over interstate
commerce).
The mere allocation of various powers between the states and the federal
government, however, does not guarantee that conflicts between laws will not exist.
Substantive constraints, such as the line between interstate and intrastate commerce, for
instance, have been notoriously difficult to draw. Courts have been hesitant to exercise
a "dormant" federal power to police state intrusions into interstate commerce.'73 This
means that states can act, generally speaking, until the federal government acts
otherwise. This also means that federal and state law will (and often do) overlap and
conflict.
The expected conflict between federal and state law explains the necessity of
creating a Supremacy Clause to resolve such conflicts in favor of federal law and
treaties. Indeed, it is worth asking why a Supremacy Clause would even be necessary if
each lawmaking mechanism recognized by the Constitution-the amending power, the
statute power, the treaty power, and the state law power-existed within its own
172 67 U.S. 481, 484 (1863).
173. See, Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298,309-10 (1992); W. Live Stock v.
Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 256-58 (1938); Sanford v. Poe, 69 F. 546 (6th Cir. 1895),
affd sub nom. Adams Express Co. v. Ohio State Auditor, 165 U.S. 194, 220 (1897).
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subject matter universe free from any possibility of conflict with the other forms of
law.
If the conflict between federal statutory law and state law is inevitable and expected,
it is difficult to believe that conflicts between treaty law and federal law would be any
more common. Unlike federal statutes, which are subjected to a battery of specific
subject matter limitations in Article I, section 8, the treaty power is not subject to any
explicit textual constraints. At best, courts have suggested the treaty power is limited
by a vague and open-ended "proper matters of international negotiation" limitation.
74
This makes conflict almost certain. The lack of meaningful subject matter limitations
on the treaty power, and the expansive scope of Congress's delegated powers under
Article I make conflict between treaties and federal statutory law unavoidable.
Second, there is a crucial difference between the legislative veto rejected by the
Court in Chadha and repeals of federal statutes pursuant to the treaty power. Unlike the
legislative veto, which was a creation of Congress pursuant to Article I, the treaty
process is a creation of the Constitution itself. While it might make sense to regard
legislative vetoes as a threat to the strict constitutionally-created procedural constraints
on Article I, it is difficult to believe that the treaty power is a similar kind of threat
since it is subject to its own constitutionally-mandated procedural constraints in Article
II. For this reason, Chadha and its progeny are best understood as limiting the ability
of each lawmaking branch to create new mechanisms for modifying or repealing their
creations. There is no reason to read those cases as limiting the ability of other
constitutionally created lawmaking mechanisms to modify or repeal each other.
Finally, accepting a Chadha-like limitation on the treaty power requires a more
limited role for the federal courts in resolving conflicts between different forms of law
than is contemplated by Article III. Under a strict formalist conception, a conflict
between state and federal law could only be resolved by either the federal or state
entity repealing its own laws. But the federal judicial power is plainly authorized to
resolve conflicts between all forms of state and "supreme Law." Indeed, it reaches "all
Cases... arising under" the Constitution, federal statutes, and treaties. 175 If the federal
courts hold the power to resolve conflicts between state and federal law, there is no
reason to exclude them from resolving conflicts between the Constitution, federal
statutes, and treaties. As Professor Yoo himself has argued, the text and structure of the
Constitution plainly support judicial review of constitutional issues. 176 From the outset,
it has been understood that federal courts have the power to engage in aggressive
judicial review of conflicts between state, federal, and constitutional law. 177 It would be
174. The contours of this limitation was most prominently articulated by Chief Justice
Charles Evan Hughes in Limitations of the Treaty-Making Power of the United States in Matters
Coming within the Jurisdiction of the States, 23 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 176, 194, 196
(1929). See also Power Auth. of N.Y. v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 247 F.2d 538,543-44 (D.C. Cir.
1957) (discussing proposed subject matter limitation), vacated by 355 U.S. 64 (1957). For a
detailed discussion of the rise and fall of the subject matter limitation, see Bradley, Treaty
Power, supra note 4, at 419-22.
175. U.S. CONST. art. m, § 2.
176. Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C. Yoo, The Origins of Judicial Review, 70 U. CH.
L. REv. 887, 890-906 (2003).
177. Id. at 912-81.
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odd to exclude treaties from the ambit of a federal court's jurisdiction to resolve
conflicts between treaties and federal statutes.
C. Text and Structure Combined
Despite internationalist claims to the contrary, there is a textual basis for the last-in-
time rule: the designation of treaties as "Law." As domestic "Law," treaties, like
federal statutes, are subject to the Constitution's background assumption for resolving
conflicts between different forms of law: the last-in-time rule. If, as internationalist
critics have argued, the inherent nature of treaty law as international law should alter
this rule with respect to other forms of law, it is unclear why the Supremacy Clause is
needed at all. The best way to reconcile this problem is to recognize that, with the
exception of constitutional law, the drafters of the Constitution understood that the last-
in-time rule would apply to different forms of enacted law, even with respect to law
enacted by different lawmaking institutions.
Moreover, the constitutional structure does not, as the leading revisionist critic
would have it, contemplate independent substantive spheres of lawmaking for each
type of law. In fact, the absence of strict substantive constraints on the treaty power
strongly suggests that conflicts with the other forms of law recognized by the
Constitution are almost inevitable. The inclusion of a Supremacy Clause reflects this
assumption with respect to state law and the other forms of law. Federal courts, granted
jurisdiction over all of these forms of law, serve as the forums for resolving such
conflicts.
This textual and structural explanation rests to some degree, as I have noted, on
claims regarding assumptions and intentions shared by the Constitution's drafters and
ratifiers. The burden of the next section is to provide the historical support for the
understanding of text and structure articulated here.
IV. THE HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF THE LAST-IN-TIME RULE
This Part reviews the leading historical account of the last-in-time rule, which
rejects the historical basis for the rule. I offer an alternative account that supports the
understanding of the text and structure articulated in Part III.
I begin by examining the origins of the last-in-time rule in the traditional English
rule for resolving conflicts among statutes and the rise of a concept of higher law in the
pre-revolutionary period. Next, I discuss conflicts among forms of law, particularly
state law and treaty law, under the Articles of Confederation. This period, which has
been largely ignored by existing scholarship on the last-in-time rule, provides strong
evidence of the Founding generation's assumption that the last-in-time rule applied to
conflicts between treaties and domestic statutes.
I then review the consideration of this problem at the constitutional and ratifying




A. Previous Historical Explanations of the Last-in-Time Rule
Critics of the last-in-time rule argue that, in addition to the rule's absence of textual
support, the rule also lacks support from historical evidence about the original intent of
the drafters of the Constitution. 7 8 In particular, Professor Lobel's leading and
influential account of the original understanding of treaties 179 soundly rejects the last-
in-time rule in favor of an internationalist view of the relationship between
international and domestic law.18 0 This internationalist history of the last-in-time rule
has gone completely unchallenged until now. The account has two components.
First, the internationalist account emphasizes the Founding generation's broad
embrace of natural law. This is important because it reflects their understanding that
the law of nations, or international law, constitutes a fundamental component of natural
law. Moreover, the Founders believed that natural law, including international law,
should operate as a constraint on positive man-made law.
181
Second, the internationalist history relies on specific statements (made by key
members of the Founding generation before, during, and after the ratification of the
Constitution) that support the higher or superior status of international law, particularly
treaties, over domestic law. Such statements, the story goes, reflect a specific
understanding that treaties cannot be superseded by domestic federal law unless the
superseding act itself conformed with international law. 182
While there is much to admire in Professor Lobel's careful treatment of the
historical evidence surrounding the last-in-time rule, his account is nonetheless
incomplete. As I will explain, Professor Lobel's conclusions, as well as the
internationalist commentators who have relied on them, overstate the extent of the
Founders' commitment to treaties over domestic law.
Most importantly, Professor Lobel's discussion fails to adequately consider the
origins of the last-in-time rule in both the British legal tradition and in the pre-
Constitution Articles period. The last-in-time rule did not, as Professor Lobel argues,
emerge only in the nineteenth century as part of an ideological conversion of the
federal judiciary to doctrines of absolute sovereignty. 8 3 Rather, under the legal
tradition that the Founders received from England, the last-in-time rule was commonly
applied to resolve conflicts between various forms of enacted law, even if those laws
were enacted by different lawmaking institutions.
Within this received legal tradition, the concept of a "higher law," that was also
positive law and judicially enforceable, was hardly a well-settled proposition. Instead,
much of the English legal tradition, best represented by Blackstone, drew a sharp
distinction between natural law, which included the law of nations, and positive man-
made law that could be interpreted and enforced by man-made institutions such as
courts. As I will show, the Americans generally accepted this English distinction and
178. E.g., Lobel, supra note 27, at 1076-96.
179. Professor Lobel's work has been tremendously influential on other scholars'
consideration of the historical basis for the last-in-time rule. E.g., Paust, supra note 108, at 763
n.28; Vasquez, supra note 6, at 2204 n.206; see also HENKIN, supra note 28, at 201.
180. Lobel, supra note 27, at 1100.
181. Id. at 1078-90.
182. Id. at 1090-100.
183. Id. at 1100-10.
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applied the last-in-time rule, the traditional rule for resolving conflicts among enacted
positive law.
The American application of the last-in-time rule to resolve conflicts among
different forms of enacted positive law, however, created difficulties during the
Articles of Confederation era because it permitted states to violate laws and treaties
concluded by the central government by passing statutes later in time. This problem
was addressed in the Constitution by altering the last-in-time rule with respect to state
law. At the same time, the Constitution's drafters emphasized the importance of giving
the Constitution itself higher law status. The resulting framework created a three-tier
system of law: constitutional law, federal and treaty law, and state law. Within each
tier, the last-in-time rule was understood to resolve conflicts.
As Professor Lobel points out, there is some evidence that the Founding generation
intended to give treaties a "higher" status as positive, judicially enforceable law.' ' But
much of the evidence he cites does not support his main contention, and, as I will
argue, the evidence supporting the last-in-time rule is far stronger and more persuasive
than Professor Lobel and other internationalists have recognized.
Of course, my historical account is hardly neat and conclusive.185 My purpose in
embarking upon this lengthy historical investigation is not to find conclusive evidence
of original intent. Rather, even if one does not subscribe to "originalism," the insights
and thoughts of the Founding generation on this question cannot be ignored in
attempting to resolve difficult constitutional interpretations.1 86 Moreover, in this case,
historical evidence is particularly important because of the way critics have relied on
the original understanding of the Constitution to justify their rejection of the last-in-
time rule. 187 Finally, a comprehensive historical discussion is necessary because
judicial applications of the last-in-time rule have failed to offer a detailed and
persuasive justification either on textual or historical grounds.
My modest goal here is to knit together, for the first time, a coherent historical
account that explains and justifies the application of the last-in-time rule to treaties and
federal statutes.
B. The English Legal Tradition
The English legal tradition remains a fixed starting point for any attempt to discuss
the development of American law in the eighteenth century. Many members of the
Founding generation were trained in English law and believed themselves to be part of
the English legal tradition.' 88 For this reason, the English treatment of the last-in-time
184. Id. at 1100.
185. Indeed, as Professor Flaherty has famously argued, historical analysis as practiced
by constitutional law theorists often sacrifices historical credibility for "reductive simplicity."
Martin S. Flaherty, History "Lite" in Modem American Constitutionalism, 95 CoLuM. L. REv.
523, 529 (1995).
186. For a more detailed explanation of this view, see H. JEFFERSON POWELL, THE
PRESIDENT's AUTHOrTY OVER FOREIGN AFFAIRS 26-30 (2003) (arguing that views of Founders
are indispensable, though not exclusive, tools of constituional interpretation).
187. E.g., HENKIN, supra note 28, at 201-04; PAUST, supra note 26, at 100.
188. FORREST MCDONALD, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 12-13 (1994) (describing
American lawyers' knowledge of English law during the framing of the Constitution).
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rule is a necessary foundation for any meaningful discussion. Moreover, the key to
unraveling the basis for the last-in-time rule is to understand its origin as an English
rule of statutory interpretation.
1. Blackstone and English Law
A crucial source for understanding the nature of English law, at least English law as
understood by eighteenth century American colonists, is the work of William
Blackstone. Blackstone's work was widely distributed and utilized during the pre-
revolutionary period. 89 For this reason, his framework for classifying different types of
law provides a crucial insight into the Founding generation's understanding of the
relationship and relative hierarchy of different forms of law.
9
'
In his famous treatise, Commentaries on the Laws of England,191 Blackstone
identified four kinds of law. The first, and most supreme law, is the law of nature.
92
This law reflects the will of the Supreme Being and, while man has free will, this free
will is "in some degree regulated and restrained" by the law of nature.193 Reason plays
an important role in the discovery of the law of nature, but its imperfection requires
that, in some cases, law can only be found through divine revelation. This law of
revelation has "infinitely more authority than" the law of nature because the latter "is
only what.., we imagine" through reason to be that law.
194
In addition to the two foundational forms of law, a third kind of law is needed to
regulate intercourse between the different states to which man has organized himself.
This "law of nations ... depends entirely upon the rules of natural law, or upon"
treaties or other agreements between those communities.
95
These three forms of law form the backdrop for Blackstone's principal interest:
municipal law. This type of law is defined as "a rule of civil conduct prescribed by the
supreme power in 'a state, commanding what is fight and prohibiting what is
189. See Donald S. Lutz, The Relative Influence of European Writers on Late
Eighteenth-Century American Political Thought, 78 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 189, 193 (1984). Sales
of Blackstone's Commentaries on the Law of England sold well in the American colonies.
About 2500 copies had been sold by the start of the Revolution in 1775, with 1400 advance
orders received before the first American edition became available between 1771 and 1772. See
EDWIN S. CORWIN, THE "HIGHER LAW" BACKGROUND OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 85
n.126 (Cornell Univ. Press 1974) (1928).
190. Although Blackstone had an unquestioned influence on the Founders' thinking, his
work has received relatively less scrutiny in the American legal academy. The leading American
discussion of Blackstone's work remains Daniel Boorstin's famous book, The Mysterious
Science of Law, which salutes Blackstone's synthesis of politics and law. DANIEL BOORSTIN, THE
MYSTERIOUS SCIENCE OFLAw: AN ESSAY ON BLACKSTONE's COMMENTARIES (1958). For other
discussions of Blackstone's importance, see PAUL 0. CARRESE, THE CLOAKING OF POWER:
MONTESQUIEU, BLACKSTONE, AND THE RISE OF JUDICIAL AcTIvIsM 109-13 (2003); Albert W.
Alschuler, Rediscovering Blackstone, 145 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1996).
191. The University of Chicago Press (1979) edition of Blackstone's work is used
throughout this paper.
192. 1 id. *38.
193.1 id. *39-40.




wrong.' "196 Municipal law, like all human laws, rests on the foundations of the law of
nature and the law of revelation. In fact, no human laws should contradict these laws.
But a great many more mundane issues are left unresolved by the law of nature and the
law of revelation, and human laws can have wide latitude to specify rules for those
issues.
197
The power to prescribe municipal law is lodged in the supreme power of a state.
There are, Blackstone observes, various forms of government that allocate this power
differently. In England, the power is uniquely shared between the two houses of
Parliament with the executive power controlled by the King.
98
For my purposes, it is crucial to understand Blackstone's conception of the relation
between the law of nature and municipal law. For certain "natural rights," duties, and
crimes, a human lawgiver only declares what is already accepted to be true. Murder,
theft, and perjury, for instance, are no more wrong simply because the human lawgiver
has declared them to be wrong. 199 On the other hand, for the many "indifferent"
matters, the sovereign holds the last word on right or wrong depending on its judgment
about the overall welfare of the society. °
2. Blackstone and the Last-in-Time Rule
For Blackstone, municipal law is "divided into two kinds; the lex non scripta, the
unwritten, or common law; and the lex scripta, the written, or statute law."20' The
unwritten law is derived from custom, while written statutory law is "either declaratory
of the common law, or remedial of defects" within it.202 Remedial statutory law fixes
imperfections in the common law attributable to mistakes by judges or to the general
imperfections of all laws.203 In light of this remedial function, "[w]here the common
law and a statute differ, the common law gives place to the statute; and an old statute
gives place to a new one.
' 204
This framework helps to explain why unwritten law (common law) and written law
(statutory law) are subject to different rules for resolving conflicts. When there is a
conflict between the common law and a statute, the statute always prevails, no matter
whether the statute was passed earlier in time to the judicial decision finding a conflict.
Because the unwritten law is understood to have pre-dated all statutes and enacted law,
no statute could, under this framework, ever exist prior in time to a common law rule.
In contrast, the power to repeal an old statute is a natural and necessary rule given
statutory law's function as a system of supplemental rules devised to revise or perfect
the common law. The Latin formulation of this concept, leges posteriors priores
contrarias abrogant (later laws abrogate prior laws that are contrary), was recognized
196. 1 id. *44.
197. 1 id. *46-67.
198. lid. *47-50.
199. 1 id. *54.
200. 1 id. *55; See also Carrese, supra note 190, at 129 (describing Blackstone's
positivist approach).
201. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 191, *63.
202. lid. *86 (emphasis in original).
203.1 id.
204. 1 id. *89.
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both by Coke in his famous Institutes of the Laws of England, and by Matthew
Bacon.20 5 Blackstone went so far as to call the priores contraria doctrine a "maxim of
universal law.., laid down by a law of the twelve tales at Rome." 2°
The power is so important, in fact, that Blackstone makes clear that "[aicts of
parliament derogatory from the power of subsequent parliaments bind not." 207 In
Blackstone's conception, the legislature's sovereign power "acknowledges no superior
upon earth, which the prior legislature must have been, if it's [sic] ordinances could




The importance Blackstone places on statutory law, as well as the sovereign
authority of the legislature, naturally calls into question the ability of courts to modify
or repeal such law. While conceding that some have argued "acts of parliament
contrary to reason are void," Blackstone doubts that this principle has ever been
adopted in English law.20 9 "[Ilf the parliament will positively enact a thing to be done
which is unreasonable, I know of no power that can control it."' 210 Further, "there is no
court that has power to defeat the intent of the legislature, when couched in such
evident and express words." ''
3. Summary
Blackstone's framework for understanding different types of law is significant to the
origins of the last-in-time rule for at least two reasons. First, it shows that English law
accepted the notion of higher law in the form of the law of nature and the law of
revelation. But it also establishes that English law gave sovereigns wide latitude to
enact municipal law. Through common law development and "remedial" statutes,
courts and legislatures prescribed rules of conduct for their subjects.
Second, Blackstone's approach, while recognizing the existence of higher law, did
not recognize the power of courts to enforce these forms of higher law as positive law
that would supersede enactments of Parliament. In this elaborate hierarchy, municipal
laws were only repealed by subsequent municipal laws. Such repeals could only occur
when conflicts were absolutely clear and no other possible construction could be
found.
To be sure, Professor Lobel has argued that Blackstone is not a fair representative
of the whole English tradition because other influential English law authorities
recognized the ability of courts to apply natural law principles to constrain or even
overturn municipal law.212 In support of this view, he cites Lord Coke's famous dictum
in Dr. Bonham's Case that "'when an act of Parliament is against common right and
205. See, e.g., 4 MATTHfEw BACON, A NEw ABRiDGEMENTOFTHELAW 638 (London, W.
Strahan 4th ed. 1778); 4 EDwARD CoKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 43 (London, M.
Flesher 1644).
206. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 191, *40.
207. 1 id. *90.
208. 1 id.
209. 1 id. *91.
210. 1 id.
211.1 id.
212. See Lobel, supra note 27, at 1082-83.
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reason, or repugnant, or impossible to be performed, the common law will controul it,
and adjudge such Act to be void."'
213
But declaring the conformity of statutes to natural law does not mean that courts
could therefore ignore improper statutes. Rather, Coke's principle may only have
required courts to construe and interpret statutes to conform with recognized legal
principles.214 As I will discuss in the next section, Americans influenced by Coke, such
as James Otis, probably understood the principle in this more limited way.
2 i s
Thus, within the English tradition, the legislature's sovereign power, though limited
by the law of nature and revelation, remains broad within the realm of municipal man-
made laws. Indeed, as one influential historian argues, Blackstone's conception was so
broad that it made Parliament the
sovereign lawmaker of the realm, whose power, however arbitrary and
unreasonable, was uncontrollable. Parliament could now actually create new law
whose binding force came not from its intrinsic justice and conformity to the
principles of the common law, but from its embodiment of the will of the social
constituents of the nation or simply its sovereign authority.
216
Therefore, any "natural law limitations on the power of Parliament were strictly
theoretical. 217 In this light, it is hardly surprising that English law adopted the
"universal maxim" of the last-in-time rule, as opposed to appeals to broader
conceptions of natural law and justice, to resolve conflicts among municipal man-made
laws.218
C. Law in Pre-Revolutionary America
Blackstone's conception of law and of the importance of a legislature in shaping law
through statutes was well known in pre-revolutionary America.219 But it would be a
mistake to believe colonial thinkers uncritically accepted Blackstone's approach on all
aspects of law, or even on fundamental questions such as the supremacy of the
legislature over municipal law. In fact, historians have argued that colonial Americans
underwent subtle but significant changes in their conception of law that eventually
departed from Blackstone and other English traditions. Thus, as Bernard Bailyn puts it,
law for Americans was reconceived from "a command 'prescribed by source superior
and which the inferior is bound to obey' into "the view 'that the only reason why a
213. Id. at 1081 (quoting 77 Eng. Rep. 638, 652 (1610)).
214. See BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
177 (1967); Samuel E. Thorne, Dr. Bonham's Case, 54 L.Q. REv. 543,545 (1938).
215. BAtLYN, supra note 214, at 188; see infra text accompanying notes 218-27.
216. GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OFTHE AMERICAN REPUBLiC 1776-1787 at 265
(1998).
217. Id. at 260.
218. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 191, at 49.
219. See David Schultz, Political Theory and Legal History: Conflicting Depictions of
Property in the American Political Founding, 37 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 464, 484 (1993) (noting




free and independent man was bound by human laws was this-that he bound
himself."
220
Colonial Americans' emphasis on reason as the basis for law's force and authority
naturally led them to consider limitations on the scope of a lawmaker's power. Thus,
the important pre-Revolutionary thinker James Otis could state "not only [that] an act
of Parliament 'against the constitution is void,' but that it was the duty of the courts to
'pass such acts into disuse,' for the 'reason of the common law [could] control an act of
Parliament. ' ' 221 In other words, Otis suggested that natural law in the form of a
constitution could somehow justify a court's rejection of an act of Parliament. Certain
rights exist that "no man or body of men, not excepting Parliament, justly, equitably,
and consistently with their own rights and the constitution can take away."
222
Professor Lobel has cited this and other statements by the influential Otis as
evidence that American colonists and legal thinkers rejected Blackstone's commitment
to parliamentary supremacy.223 But Otis's views on the role of courts in controlling
parliamentary acts are deeply ambiguous. Otis's robust conception of natural rights
appeared to co-exist with his faith in Parliament as the ultimate institution empowered
to protect the natural rights he valued.224 As Professor Wood explains, Otis "never
conceived [of natural rights] being so fundamental that they had to be differentiated
and separated from the institutions of government and the ordinary statutes of
Parliament." 225 In this way, Otis's ambivalent opinions on the acceptability ofjudicial
control over statutes coincided with most English thinkers.
226
It is here that Professor Lobel's otherwise convincing analysis runs into difficulties.
Much of his argument depends on discussions of a variety of natural and international
law authorities and statements by members of the Founding generation endorsing the
supremacy of those authorities.227 But he does not appreciate the significance of the
intermediate position sketched out by Otis and others, which paid respect to the
supremacy of natural law while at the same time denying any institution other than the
sovereign legislature the authority to alter municipal law to enforce this supremacy.
Otis matters because he has been credited by historians for serving as a crucial
bridge between the traditional English law framework outlined by Blackstone and the
220. BAILYN, supra note 214, at 174 (quoting James Wilson).
221. Id. at 176 (alteration in original).
222. WOOD, supra note 216, at 262-63 (quoting James Otis).
223. See Lobel, supra note 27, at 1081 n.48.
224. See BAIImYN, supra note 214, at 177.
225. WOOD, supra note 216, at 262-63.
226. See Thorne, supra note 214, at 545; see also 1 KENT, supra note 75, at 419-20:
When it is said in the [English law] books that a statute contrary to natural
equity and reason or repugnant or impossible to be performed, is void, the
cases are understood to mean that the courts are to give the statute a
reasonable construction. They will not readily presume, out of respect and
duty to the lawgiver, that any very unjust or absurd consequence was within
the contemplation of the law. But if it should happen to be too palpable in
its direction to admit of but one construction, there is no doubt in the
English law as to the binding efficacy of the statute. The will of the
legislature is the supreme law of the land, and demands perfect obedience.
227. See, e.g., Lobel, supra note 27, at 1078-84.
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reason-based, constitution-centered focus of Revolutionary America. 228 He appears to
have laid the intellectual groundwork for later American intellectual innovations-in
particular, the distinctive American commitment to higher written constitutional law.
For our purposes, it is important to recognize the prevailing baseline assumption during
the colonial period: municipal law, or human law, remained subordinate to natural law.
The hard question that Americans began to face, however, revolved around who had
the power to shape or revise municipal man-made law to conform to increasingly
robust conceptions of natural law popular in colonial America. The first examples of
this struggle can be found in the years after the approval of the Articles of
Confederation in 1778.
D. The Articles Period
The Revolutionary War and its aftermath have often been overlooked by
constitutional law scholars in favor of the Philadelphia Convention and subsequent
state ratifying conventions.229 But historians have long considered the importance of
the establishment of the Articles of Confederation at the outset of the war, and its
operation throughout the 1780s, as an important period for the formation of American
constitutionalism and of American law in general.230 Indeed, as I will explain, the
Articles Congress, both in war and peace, faced difficult legal questions about the legal
force of the Articles themselves and of treaties concluded under the authority of the
Articles Congress.231 Their resolutions of these questions reveal the continued
importance of the last-in-time rule as a mechanism for resolving conflicts among laws.
Most importantly, the evidence from the Articles period establishes that major figures
in the Founding period recognized that the last-in-time rule governed conflicts between
treaties and municipal law.
1. Constitutions and Higher Law
Although his approach has been criticized by historians in recent years, 232 Gordon
Wood's argument about the development of American constitutionalism remains
enormously influential, especially in the legal academy. Wood famously argued that
American constitutionalism represented a serious and meaningful break with its
English political and legal heritage as well as a reaction to the excesses of the state
governments during the Articles period. 33
The idea of a constitution revealed and clarified by 1776 was not only explored
and expanded in the subsequent years but the metaphors and analogies that
228. See BAILYN, supra note 214, at 186-87.
229. See Eric M. Freedman, Why Constitutional Lawyers and Historians Should Take a
Fresh Look at the Emergence of the Constitution from the Confederation Period: The Case of
the Drafting of the Articles of Confederation, 60 TENN. L. REV. 783, 784 (1993).
230. See, e.g., WOOD, supra note 216, at 421-29.
231. See infra Part IV.D.2.
232. See, e.g., MARC W. KRUMAN, BETWEEN AUTHORITY & LIBERTY: STATE
CONsTrruTION MAKING IN REvOLUTIONARY AMERICA 109-30 (1997).
233. WooD, supra note 216, at 421-29.
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underlay the Americans' constitutional conceptions were radically altered as
well-all contributing by the late 1780's to an often unsurely grasped but
decisively new interpretation of the character of constitutional restraints on
political power.
234
This evolving conception of constitutional law meant that although the American
colonies had embraced constitutions, and even written constitutions, the prevailing
practice of state assemblies during the Articles period was to amend such constitutions
or state charters through ordinary legislation.235 How could ordinary legislation alter
written constitutions? Because of the very doctrine identified by Blackstone as the
"universal" maxim, the last-in-time rule. This rule forbade a prior legislature from
binding its successors. Thus, as Jefferson observed with respect to Virginia's own
constitution, "[blecause no legislature could pass an act transcendent of the power of
other legislatures, the [Virginia] Constitution was merely an ordinance" with "no
higher authority than the other ordinances of the same session. 236
Not all Americans agreed, however, with the prevailing practice of amending
constitutions via ordinary legislation. As early as 1784, Thomas Tudor Tucker argued
in a South Carolina pamphlet that a constitution should be a fundamental law "declared
paramount to all acts of the Legislature, and irrepealable and unalterable .... ,,237 The
last-in-time rule, though widely recognized and accepted, appeared to be an obstacle to
the growing American commitment to fundamental constitutional law.
Even as Americans disagreed on the status of fundamental law, they also worried
about the role of courts in enforcing a fundamental law. Because colonial and early
state courts held so much discretion in the application of a hodgepodge of English
common law and local statutory law, courts were the natural forums for enforcing this
constitution against the legislature. But the idea of giving courts the power to overturn
legislative acts troubled Americans during this period. Giving courts such a power,
James Madison observed in comments on Jefferson's draft constitution for Virginia,
"makes the Judiciary Department Paramount in fact to the Legislature, which was
never intended and can never be proper."
238
Americans thus struggled with at least two difficult problems related to the last-in-
time rule during this period. First, the American commitment to a robust form of
natural law, first promulgated by thinkers like Otis in the pre-war period, clashed with
the notion of legislative supremacy embodied in the last-in-time rule. Second, even as
some Americans, like Jefferson, moved to enshrine constitutional law with superior
legal force, they recognized that this would give courts the authority to essentially
overrule legislative acts.
2. The Articles and Higher Law
The problem of the lack of "higher law" status for state constitutional law also
existed with respect to the Articles of Confederation. The legal status of the Articles
234. Id. at 259-60.
235. Id. at 274-75.
236. Id. at 276.
237. id. at 281.
238. 6 TiiE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 315 (Julian P. Boyd ed.. 1952).
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with respect to state law was highly ambiguous and contested. Indeed, the Articles
were considered by many Americans to be a mere treaty between the state governments
rather than a constitution.
39
The language of the Articles reflects its treaty-like status. It established a "firm
league of friendship" to better "secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and
intercourse among the people of the different states in this union.''4° Further, the
Articles make clear that "[e]ach state retains its sovereignty, freedom and
independence, and every Power, Jurisdiction and right, which is not by this
confederation expressly delegated....241
Although the Articles do not contain any provision similar to the Supremacy Clause,
they do grant the Articles Congress the "sole and exclusive right and power of...
entering into treaties ... ."242 Even this power was limited to exclude "treaties of
commerce" that restrained the legislative power of the respective states from imposing
duties and imposts on foreigners.243 Still, this limitation does suggest that, with that
single exception, treaties made by the Articles Congress could restrain the legislative
power of the states.
On the other hand, the practice of the states during the Articles period suggested
that the treaty bound states only in the same way that natural law or the law of nations
bound Parliament under Blackstone's framework. State legislatures should respect
treaty obligations, but if they breach those obligations, there is no positive law
mechanism for remedying the breach. As Jefferson himself argued, the power to make
a treaty under the Articles gives a power to treaty, but it does not "include ex vi termini
a power to pass away every thing by treaty which might be the subject of the treaty. ' 244
Indeed, as I will discuss below, a number of states seemed willing to pass legislation
in clear breach of the Treaty of Paris, the treaty ending the Revolutionary War and
recognizing American independence. These violations suggest that treaties did not,
under the Articles, hold a superior legal force as either "federal" law or higher
"international" law.
3. Rutgers v. Waddington
One of the most famous disputes between a state law and the Treaty of Paris during
the Articles period was litigated in New York by none other than Alexander Hamilton.
Rutgers v. Waddington2 45 involved a suit by an American property owner against a
British merchant for back rent due to that merchant's occupation of the American's
property during the British wartime occupation of New York.24
The plaintiffs claim relied on the Trespass Act, a New York statute enacted at
about the same time that the Treaty of Paris was finalized. The Trespass Act authorized
239. See Golove, supra note 151, at 1702.
240. DIE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, art. 3-4.
241. Id art. 2.
242 Id. art. 9.
243. Id.
244. 2 THE PAPERS OFTHOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 238, at 120.
245. Rutgers v. Waddington (N.Y. City Mayor's Ct. 1784), reprinted in I THE LAW
PRACTICE OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 393 (Julius Goebel, Jr. et al. eds. 1964).
246. 1 TaE LAw PRACTICE OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 245, at 320-28.
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claims by property owners for use of their land during the war and prohibited the
pleading of military orders and military authorization as justification for the land
use. 247 The British defendant argued, however, that notwithstanding the Trespass Act,
both the law of nations and the Treaty of Paris justified his occupation of the disputed
property. In this case, the British defendant had paid rent to the British military
authorities who had seized plaintiff's abandoned property upon occupying New
York. 45
Judge Duane's opinion in Rutgers is widely remembered for refusing to enforce the
New York statute in the face of the law of nations, thus presaging both the rise of
judicial review in the United States and a role for customary international law in
domestic American law.249 The court's opinion dodged the question of whether the
Treaty of Paris superseded the New York statute, suggesting that the treaty's status
with respect to state law was difficult to resolve.250
To modern eyes, the conflict between the Treaty and the New York statute is a
classic federalism question. But in 1784, the conflict between these two forms of law
was much more complicated. Within the Blackstonian framework, the New York state
legislature was the supreme sovereign legislative power. Thus, even if the treaty did
impose some obligation on the New York court, the New York legislature's passage of
the later-in-time Trespass Act could repeal the Treaty's effect within New York.
This is exactly the argument wielded by the plaintiffs. Even if the treaty was a valid
exercise of the federal government's power under the Articles, the Articles had
received only legislative ratification in New York. Therefore, any later-in-time rule
could amend or repeal the previous legislative act, for example, granting Congress the
power to make a treaty."
Hamilton's response to this argument reveals that the last-in-time rule for treaties
was a serious and plausible position at the time. Most notably, Hamilton did not reject
the plaintiffs' claim that a later-in-time legislative act could repeal a previously
concluded treaty due to the international obligations imposed by the treaty. In fact, his
brief to the court appears to concede that "the sovereign authority may for reasons of
state violate its treaties and the laws in violation bind its own subjects. 252
Instead of arguing against the last-in-time rule as a whole, he simply argues that the
rule does not apply to individual state statutes. "[I]n our Constitution it is not true that
the sovereignty of any one state has legally this power. Each state has delegated all
power of this kind to Congress. They are equally to judge of the necessity of breaking
as the propriety of making treaties." '253 Importantly for my purposes, Hamilton
247. 1 id. at 319-20.
248. 1 id. at 326-27.
249. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, All About Words: Early Understandings of the
"Judicial Power" in Statutory Interpretation, 1776-1806, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 990, 1025
(2001); Prakash & Yoo, supra note 176, at 936.
250. 1 THE LAW PRACTICE OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 245, at 377.
251. 1 id. at 380. To be sure, the plaintiffs also made two alternative arguments: an
interpretive argument, contending that the treaty did not expressly contradict the Trespass Act;
and a federalism argument, that the Treaty exceeded the federal government's authority under
the Articles. l id. at 336-37.
252. 1 id. at 377-78.
253. 1 id. at 378.
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concedes the power of a legislature to violate treaties, despite those treaties'
international character.
Eventually, Hamilton focused his argument on interpreting the Trespass Act to
avoid conflict with the law of nations and the treaty. This strategy proved a success.
Even though Judge Duane's opinion seemed to declare that the treaty, made and
ratified according to the Articles, "rendered its obligation perpetual," his focus
remained on the problem of an individual state attempting to "alter or abridge" the
articles of the treaty.2 54 On the other hand, "the operation and effects of the treaty,
within our own state, are fit subjects of enquiry and decision. ' ,25 In these
circumstances, echoing Blackstone, the judge conceded plaintiffs' argument that if the
New York legislature "think fit positively to enact a law, there is no power which can
controul [sic] them."
256
Nonetheless, Judge Duane avoided the problem of whether the treaty repealed the
statute by accepting Hamilton's claim that the statute could be read consistent with the
law of nations and the treaty. Even here, his analysis reflects an assumption that the
last-in-time rule could apply. Calling the last-in-time rule a "true rule," he invokes
another canon of statutory construction to find for the defendants, explaining that
"repeals by implication are disfavoured by law." 25 7
Thus, although Rutgers v. Waddington stands today as a precursor of the American
practice of judicial review, it also reveals the difficulties of reconciling American
conceptions of law with the new Articles system. While Professor Lobel has cited the
case to bolster the argument for judicially enforceable international law, 258 neither he
nor any other internationalist scholars have recognized that all of the players in the case
the plaintiffs' counsel, Hamilton, and Judge Duane believed that a sovereign legislature
could violate a treaty obligation by passing a later-in-time statute and that a court
would be bound to enforce that law.
4. The Jay Report
Rutgers v. Waddington reveals, in great detail, the difficulties that leading attorneys
such as Hamilton faced in reconciling treaties and laws during the Articles period. Of
course, the disputes over the Treaty of Paris were not limited to New York, nor did the
disputes over the treaty remain limited to the consequences of military occupation. In
the end, Article 4 of the treaty, guaranteeing "Creditors on either side" that there will
be "no lawful Impediment to the Recovery of the full value" of debts contracted prior
to the war, became the greater source of conflict.25 9 Additionally, Article 5 added that
254. 1 id. at 413.
255. 1 id.
256. 1 id. at 415.
257. 1 id. at 417; see also WooD, supra note 216, at 457 (discussing Rutgers).
258. See Lobel, supra note 27, at 1085.
259. Definitive Treaty of Peace, Sept. 3, 1783, U.S.-Gr. Brit., art. 4 [hereinafter Treaty
of Peace]. For background on the negotiation and final agreement, see SAMUEL F. BEMIS, JAY'S
TREATY: A STUDY IN COMMERCE AND DIPLOMACY 51-121 (1962); RICHARD B. MORRIS, THE
PEACEMAKERS, THE GREATPOWERS AND AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE (1965); Richard B. Morris,
The Durable Significance of the Treaty of 1783, in PEACE ANDTHE PEACEMAKERS, THE TREATY
OF 1783 230-50 (Ronald Hoffman & Peter J. Albert eds., 1986).
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"it is agreed that all Persons who have any interest in confiscated Lands, either by
Debts, Marriage Settlements, or otherwise, shall meet with no lawful Impediment in the
Prosecution of their just Rights."2 °
Given that many postwar Americans were deeply in debt to British creditors, these
two provisions empowering British litigants to seek recovery of their debts proved
highly unpopular. A number of states began passing laws prohibiting courts from
261granting British creditors any recoveries.
These state laws prompted the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, John Jay, to circulate a
letter to the states urging compliance with the offending treaty provisions. Jay's famous
letter sketched a position on the legal status of treaties more radical than was
recognized by the court in Rutgers. Treaties were the law of the land even without
intervention of the state legislatures. 262 Additionally, the application of treaties should
be a matter for courts following laws of nations and "that no individual State has a right
by legislative Acts to decide and point out the sense in which their particular Citizens
and Courts shall understand this or that Article of a treaty.
2 63
Read more closely, however, it is far from clear that Jay is claiming that state
positive law inconsistent with a treaty would have no effect. He elides the issue by
stating that "[hiow far such legislative Acts would be valid and obligatory even within
the limits of the State passing them, is a question which we hope never to have
occasion to discuss." 264 He adds only that it is "[c]ertain ... that such Acts cannot bind
either of the contracting Sovereigns, and consequently cannot be obligatory on their
respective Nations. 265
Understood in the context of the Articles system, all this statement really means is
that the "contracting sovereign," that is, the federal government, remains obligated to
its treaty partner under international law despite state laws repealing a treaty's
domestic law effects. It does not mean that courts should void any laws that are
inconsistent with treaty obligations. Jay's main point is that the offending state laws are
causing negative foreign policy consequences. Indeed, he concedes that "contracting
Nations cannot like individuals avail themselves of Courts of Justice to compel
performance of contracts ... "266 Rather, the real threat is "an appeal to Heaven and to
260. Treaty of Peace, supra note 259, at art. 5.
261. See Jack N. Rakove, Making Foreign Policy--The View from 1787, in FOREIGN
POUCY AND THE CONsTrrUTON 1-3 (Robert A. Goldwin & Robert A. Licht eds., 1990)
262.4 SECRET JOURNALS OF THE ACTS AND PROCEEDINGS OFCONGRESS, FROM THE FIRST
MEETING THEREOF TO THE DISSOLUTION OF THE CONFEDERATION, BY THE ADOPTION OF THE
CONSTITUTION OFTHE UNITED STATES 204 (1821):
When therefore a treaty is constitutionally made, ratified and published by
us, it immediately becomes binding on the whole nation, and superadded to
the laws of the land, without the intervention, consent or fiat of state
legislatures ... Hence it is clear, that treaties must be implicitly received
and observed by every Member of the Nation ....
263. 32 JOURNALS OF CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-1789, 179 (U.S. GPO 1936).
264. 32 id.
265. 32 id.
266. 32 id. at 180.
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Arms. 267 In other words, state violations of the treaty do not remove the international
legal consequences of the treaty on the United States. This does not mean such state
laws are void. Of course, it does mean that treaty partners could appeal to "Arms" to
enforce their treaty obligations.
This understanding of Jay's thinking is consistent with the congressional resolutions
that were passed in response to his report urging states to repeal laws violating the
treaty. Although the resolutions declare that "'the Legislatures of the several States
cannot of right pass any Act or Acts for interpreting ... nor for restraining, ...
retarding, or counteracting the operation and execution of the same [because] they
become the... Law of the Land ... ". ' the resolutions do not declare inconsistent state
laws void.268 Rather, the resolutions explain that as a treaty of peace, the Treaty of
Paris is a law of the United States, and therefore
all State Acts establishing provisions relative to the same objects, which are
incompatible with it, must in every point of view be improper. Such Acts do
nevertheless exist, but we do not think it necessary either to enumerate them
particularly or to make them severally the subjects of discussion. It appears to us
sufficient to observe and insist, that the treaty ought to have free course in its
operation and execution, and that all obstacles interposed by State Acts be
removed. 269
Therefore, the Articles Congress requested "[tihat all such Acts or parts of Acts, as
may be now existing in any of the States repugnant to the treaty of peace ought be
forthwith repealed, as well to prevent their continuing to be regarded as violations of
that treaty...27
The phrasing of these resolutions does not make sense if Congress was simply
declaring such laws inconsistent with treaty obligations. Having declared state laws in
plain violation of international treaties, and having even been told by Jay that such laws
could serve as a justification for war by a treaty partner, such laws were merely called
"improper." Then, after declaring that treaties are the "Law of the Land," the
resolutions are forced to concede that state laws in violation of the treaty "nevertheless
exist." Moreover, Congress is then reduced to "observ[ing] and insist[ing] that the
treaty ought to have free course ... "271
During debates over the Jay Report and its proposed resolutions, some members of
Congress did in fact suggest that the resolutions need only declare that state laws
violating the treaty were void. Madison responded that state court judges are more
likely to rely on state law than national resolutions.272 Importantly, he also argues that
asking states to repeal the offending laws would be the best approach because
[A] distinction too... might be started possibly between laws prior & laws
subsequent to the Treaty; a Repealing effect of the Treaty on the former, not
267. 32 id.
268. 32 id. at 181 (quoting unanimous resolution).
269. 32 id. (emphasis added)
270. 32 id. at 181-82 (emphasis added).
271. 32 id.
272. 33 id. at 728.
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necessarily implying the nullity of the latter. Supposing the Treaty to have the
validity of a law only, it would repeal all antecedent laws. To render succeeding
laws void it must have more than the mere authority of a law.
2 73
Madison's support for the plan to seek state-by-state repeal was broadly consistent
with the Blackstonian framework concerning the relationship between different forms
of enacted law. In Madison's conception, a treaty "would only repeal all antecedent
273. 32 id. (emphasis added and emphasis removed). Lobel concedes the existence of
this statement but understates its importance by describing it, in a footnote, as "tentative." See
Lobel, supra note 27, at 1097 n.134. Madison did not like the last-in-time rule, but his
recognition of its existence was not tentative. See 33 JOURNALS OF CONTINENTAL CONGRESS,
supra note 263, at 729:
In case these succeeding laws contrary to the Treaty should come into
discussion before the Courts, it would be necessary to examine the
foundation of the federal authority, and to determine whether it had the
validity of a Constitution, paramount (sic] to the legislative authority in
each State. This was a delicate question, and studiously to be avoided as it
was notorious that although in some of the States the Confederation was
incorporated with & had the sanction of their respective Constitutions, yet
in others it rec'd a legislative ratification only and rested on no other basis.
He admitted however that the word operate might be changed for the better
& proposed in its place, the words 'be regarded' as violations of the Treaty
which was agreed to without objection.
Jefferson's analysis of this issue was more ambiguous, but he appeared to take the same
view. Responding to a complaint by the French Ambassador over an alleged violation of a treaty
with France, he notes that his opinions have little weight with judges. "Their Guide is the Law
of the Land, of which Law its Treaties make a Part." Thomas Jefferson, Jefferson's
Amplification of Subjects Discussed with Vergennes (circa Dec. 20, 1785), in 9 THE PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 238, at 107, 110. After explaining that Georgia law does not
violate treaty obligations because it places French claim on same level as native, he explained:
The Treaty has placed the Subjects of France on a footing with Natives as
to Conveiances [sic] and Descent of Property. There was no Occasion for
the Assemblies to pass Laws on this Subject, the Treaty being a Law, as I
conceive, superior to those of particular Assemblies, and repealing them
where they stand in the Way of its Operation. The Supposition that the
Treaty was disregarded on our Part in the Instance of the Acts of Assembly
of Massachusetts and New Hampshire which made a Distinction between
Natives and Foreigners as to the Duties to be paid on Commerce, was taken
Notice of in the Letter of Nov. 20 .... And while I express my Hopes that,
on a Revision of these Subjects, nothing will be found in them derogatory
from either the Letter or Spirit of our Treaty, I will add Assurances that the
U.S. will not be behind-hand in going beyond both, whenever Occasions




laws. ' 274 In order for treaties to render "succeeding" laws void, thereby ending the last
in time presumption, treaties would have to have "more" than the mere authority of
law.
275
In sum, the significance of the Articles period has often been overlooked by legal
scholars, and critics of the last-in-time rule have been no exception. Contrary to the
prevailing historical account of this period, the concept of treaties as "higher" law
restraining positive lawmaking was not widely accepted during this period. Instead, the
last-in-time rule was a well-settled doctrine for resolving disputes among different
forms of enacted municipal law. States passed laws purporting to "repeal" treaties and
Congress responded by asking the states to "repeal" the offending statutes. Key
members of the Founding generation, especially Alexander Hamilton and James
Madison, recognized that the last-in-time rule could operate to allow state legislatures
to override the domestic effect of treaties by enacting later in time statutes.
E. The Constitutional Convention
It is well known that the state violations of the Treaty of Paris were one of the
primary motivations for convening what became the Constitutional Convention in
276Philadelphia. But the eventual creation of a constitution giving treaties status as
"supreme law" over the states did not by itself resolve the thorny question of how
treaty law would interact with laws emanating from the new federal government.
Members of the Convention did not focus a great deal of their attention on the treaty
power,277 and to the extent they did, most of their energy was devoted to exploring the
relationship between treaty law and state law.278 Still, there is little evidence that the
members believed treaty law, once it became self-executing law, would have a higher
status than other federal law due to its international character.
1. Treaties and the Supremacy Clause
Recent scholarly attention has focused on the difficult question of whether the
framers intended treaties to have the status of "self-executing" law and on the scope of
the treaty power over the states. The question of whether treaties would have a higher
or lower status than federal law was never directly addressed in the context of the
treaty power or the supremacy clause.
Thus, the delegates' debates over the supremacy of federal law and treaties focused
on the central government's mechanism for ensuring federal supremacy rather than on
the status of federal versus treaty law. For instance, the original Virginia Plan provided
for a federal power "to negative" state laws in contravention with the Constitution or
274. See 33 JOURNA.S OF CONntNENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 263, at 728 (emphasis
added).
275. 33 id (emphasis added).
276. See Jack N. Rakove, Solving a Constitutional Puzzle: The Treaty-making Clause
as a Case Study, 1 Persp. Am. Hist. 233, 267-68 (1984).
277. Id. at 236.
278. See, e.g., Yoo, Globalism, supra note 6, at 2000-12.
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with treaties.279 The "national veto" mechanism actually remained consistent with
much of the last in time concept because it would have transferred to the new federal
legislature the power to block inconsistent state law through a subsequent act of
legislation.
For various reasons, the national veto plan was abandoned, with the delegates
eventually settling on a supremacy clause granting the Constitution, federal statutes,
and treaties supreme law status over state law.280 The discussions about including
treaties in the Supremacy Clause, however, do not appear to directly contemplate the
relation of treaties to other federal law or the Constitution.
The Convention records do support the view, however, that treaties were to have
operation as law under the Supremacy Clause. For this reason, delegates such as James
Wilson proposed amendments to give the House a role in treaty-making, 281 and
Madison sought to distinguish between certain treaties that would operate as law on
their own and others that would require action by the House.282 Both of these
proposals, however, were rejected. The final version of the Treaty and Supremacy
Clause resulted in treaties that had the operation as supreme law and without any
explicit subject matter limitations. The question of whether treaties had "higher" status
was simply not raised in this context.
2. The Method of Ratification of the Constitution
This is not to say that the delegates did not share some understanding of the status
of treaties vis-a-vis other laws. Although the question of how to ratify the new
Constitution does not seem directly related to the status of treaty law, the decision to
use popular conventions rather than state legislatures to ratify the Constitution reflected
the delegates' understanding that treaties and all other forms of enacted law could be
repealed by an ordinary act of legislation.
As discussed previously, the pre-war and Articles period were characterized by a
surfeit of intellectual discussion about the higher law status of constitutions.283
Americans were troubled by English insistence on parliamentary supremacy over
municipal law and looked for a positive "higher law." This contrasted with the
Blackstonian and English conception of higher law as a moral, but not a positive,
limitation on legislative power. The experience of divergent state governments during
the Articles period, as many historians have argued, further confirmed the belief among
key Americans that the new country needed a positive fundamental law.
284
In particular, the concept of higher law collided directly with the last-in-time rule.
As Jefferson and Madison discovered in their work on the Virginia Constitution, and as
Hamilton discovered during his litigation in Rutgers v. Waddington, the last-in-time
rule had been repeatedly invoked to limit the effect of state constitutional law, treaties,
and the Articles of Confederation itself.
279. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 21 (Max Farrand ed.,
1911).
280. 1 id. at 164.
281. 2 id. at 400; Rakove, supra note 282, at 241 & n. 14.
282. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 279, at 394.
283. See supra Part IV.D.
284. See, e.g., WOOD, supra note 216, at 260.
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The decision by convention delegates to send their new proposed federal
constitution to popular conventions, rather than to the state legislatures (in contrast to
the way that the Articles had been approved), reflected an attempt to avoid the last-in-
time rule. As Madison declared, the Articles were defective because, having been
approved by the state legislature, "in conflicts between acts of the States, and of
Congs., especially where the former are of posterior date, and the decision is to be
made by State Tribunals, an uncertainty must necessarily prevail ....
Yates's account of this declaration clarifies that Madison saw the last-in-time rule as
the main obstacle to be overcome for enforcement of a fundamental higher law.
28 6
While Madison's view on the operation of the last-in-time rule was contested by
opponents of the ratifying conventions, other delegates, like George Mason, appeared
to believe the states would retain power to overrule even a constitution ratified by
popular convention.
287
Madison reiterated his argument for ratification by convention by again arguing that
the last-in-time rule would allow states to overrule even the new Constitution. A
description of his reasoning is worth quoting at length:
[Madison] considered the difference between a system founded on the Legislatures
only, and one founded on the people, to be the true difference between a league or
treaty, and a Constitution. The former in point of moral obligation might be as
inviolable as the latter. In point of political operation, there were ... important
distinctions in favor of the latter. 1. A law violating a treaty ratified by preexisting
law, might be respected by the Judges as law, though an unwise or perfidious one.
A law violating a constitution established by the people themselves, would be
considered by the Judges as null & void.288
Madison was speaking of the difference between the Articles, a self-described
"league" which plausibly had only the status of a treaty, and a constitution ratified by
popular convention. Although states had a "moral" obligation to obey the Articles, this
does not mean "a law violating a treaty" would not be respected by judges as law.2
89
Madison's conception of the relationship of treaties to law reflects a synthesis of
various competing conceptions of law percolating in the pre-war and post-war period.
As Blackstone stated, all human law was subject to the higher laws of nature and
revelation. However, only the sovereign had the authority to "make" positive human
law and adjust it to conform with such higher law. In Blackstone's conception, this
supreme sovereign was Parliament, and no power could "controul" this sovereign. 290
Americans like Otis had wanted to give greater positive content to the higher natural
law,291 and others began advocating for a written constitution to vindicate these higher
law values72 2 But in practical terms, the courts and many state legislatures continued to
285. 1 Ti RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 279, at 122-23
(emphasis added).
286. 1 id.
287.2 id. at 91.
288. 2 id. at 93 (emphasis added).
289. 2 id.
290. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 191, at 49.
291. See supra text accompanying notes 221-27.
292. See supra text accompany note 237-38.
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follow a Blackstonian approach claiming ultimate control over all positive law through,
at the very least, the power to pass subsequent legislation. Madison, drawing from his
experience in Virginia and in the Articles Congress, was attempting to find a solution
to this problem by shifting Blackstone's notion of sovereignty away from the
legislature and to the "people," who would act through ratifying conventions. This
would give constitutional law, unlike the Articles and other treaties, a fundamental law
status superior to ordinary legislation.
F. The Ratification Debates
The Philadelphia Convention is hardly the last word for those seeking to understand
the original intent of the Constitutional text. As a matter of political theory, the acts of
popular sovereignty embodied in the state ratifying conventions, and not the mere
framing of the Constitution in Philadelphia, transformed the proposed Constitution into
law. Hence, the meaning of the Constitution as understood by the ratifiers may hold
greater weight than the intent of the convention delegates. 293 Whether or not the
ratifying convention materials are more important, the materials are at least as
important as any other to understanding the last-in-time rule.
A review of debates from two of the major state ratifying conventions where the
treaty power was discussed, Virginia and New York, reveals further evidence that a
treaty's interaction with federal law was different from how that treaty would interact
with state law. This stems, at least in part, from the debaters' focus on the relationship
between the treaties and state law, which had now changed by virtue of the Supremacy
Clause. Overall, the discussion in the ratifying debates, mainly (though not
unanimously) supports my claim that the basic background assumption for resolving
conflicts between treaties and federal statutes is the last-in-time rule.
1. Virginia
As the largest southern state, Virginia's ratification played a crucial role in the
overall success of the Federalist campaign. For contemporary scholars of the treaty
power, Virginia's convention is also important because the quality and depth of the
discussion on the treaty power exceeds the recorded debates from any other state
convention. 294 Previous historical investigations of the last-in-time rule, however, have
295largely ignored the discussion in Virginia.
The Anti-Federalists, led by George Mason and Patrick Henry, saw the treaty power
created by the Constitution as a strange and dangerous innovation. 296 Not only did
Anti-Federalist critics attack the allocation of the treaty power to the President and the
Senate without the inclusion of the House, but they also challenged the decision to give
treaties status as domestic law and then to make them superior to state law. As Patrick
Henry argued, "to say that [treaties] are municipal is to me a doctrine totally novel. -
To make them paramount to the Constitutions and laws of the States is
293. Yoo, Treaties, supra note 6, at 2222 n.17.
294. See Flaherty, supra note 6, at 2147-49.
295. See. e.g., Lobel, supra note 27, at 1090-100.
296. 10 THE DoCuMENTARY HISTORY OFTHE RATIFICATION OF THE CONsTrruION 1380
(John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1993) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY].
[Vol. 80:319
TREATIES AS LAWS
unprecedented. 297 He went on to argue, even more dramatically, that the treaties made
will be paramount "to the Constitution, and everything." Referring to the power to
make treaties (which he imprecisely attributes to Congress rather than to the Senate),
he charged, "[w]ill not the laws of Congress [treaties] be binding on Congress... T'298
Henry's attacks on the self-execution of treaties and the Federalist response have
been the subject of exhaustive analysis and I do not mean to revisit that discussion
here. 299 Rather, I focus on the Federalist response to Henry's claims because they
reveal, albeit somewhat indirectly, certain Federalist assumptions about the relationship
of treaty law to federal statutes. Three different Virginia Federalists attempted to rebut
Henry's attacks. In doing so, they supported the understanding of the Constitution's
text and structure outlined in Part III: treaties are subordinate to the Constitution but
supreme over state laws. By implication, I contend, the Virginia Federalists also
endorsed the equality of treaties and federal laws and the last-in-time rule.
a. Nicholas
Responding to Henry's claims that the federal government could, by treaty, invade
individual rights and subvert federal law and the Constitution, George Nicholas argued
that the Supremacy Clause made clear that treaties are subordinate to the Constitution.
Because treaties are made "under the authority of the United States," treaties are
limited to matters pursuant to the powers given to the treaty makers by the
Constitution. Through this reasoning, Nicholas concluded that no treaty "repugnant to
the spirit of the Constitution or inconsistent with the delegated powers" could be
valid.3°°
Nicholas's reasoning is somewhat convoluted because he essentially argues that the
phrase "under the authority of the United States" limits treaties to whatever powers
were delegated by the Constitution to the treaty makers in the same way that the phrase
"in pursuance" limits federal statutes. Although he does not define the limits of the
delegation "under the authority of the United States," his response does provide
evidence that supporters of the ratification understood that the last-in-time rule did not
control conflicts between the Constitution and a treaty.
b. Corbin
Further attempts to respond to Henry's charges about the "unlimited" treaty power,
however, confused matters. Responding to complaints that treaties would be
"paramount to the Constitution itself, and the laws of Congress," Corbin declared that
"[iut is as clear, as that two and two make four, that the treaties made are to be binding
on the States only."
3°1
297.10 id. at 1382.
298. 10 id. at 1395.
299. Compare Yoo, Treaties, supra note 6, at 2221-33, with Flaherty, supra note 6, at
2009-105.
300. 10 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 296, at 1389.
301. 10 id. at 1392.
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As Professor Flaherty has observed, whatever else might be said about it, this
statement is far from clear. 30 2 It seems to suggest that treaties are supreme to state law
but not supreme to any other kind of law. Because no other Federalist endorsed this
view, Corbin himself may have had a different meaning. If the last-in-time rule serves
as a background assumption, then Corbin's statement that "treaties made are to be
binding on the States only" can be understood as drawing a distinction between treaties
"binding" states irreversibly as opposed to treaties that could be subject to later
congressional revision by statute. In this way, "binding" in Corbin's phraseology refers
to giving treaties "supreme" status over the states. This understanding of Corbin's use
of the phrase "binding" is confirmed by his warning that "treaties would never be
complied with, if their observance depended on the will of the States... [f]or, if any




Corbin's statement confused Henry, who demanded clarification on whether
treaties' domestic effects were as limited as Corbin argued. "Can any thing be
paramount to what is paramount?-Will not the laws of Congress be binding on
Congress, as well as on any particular State?-Will they not be bound by their own
acts?
,,3°4
Madison's response to Henry's wild speculations about the new treaty power is
illuminating. The treaty "power is precisely in the new Constitution, as it is in the
Confederation. '" 30 5 Under the existing system, "Congress are authorized indefinitely to
make treaties.,, 306 Referring to the state laws passed to comply with the Jay Report,
Madison said that many of the states recognized the power of Congress to make
treaties under the Confederation.
307
Madison then goes on to argue that the treaty power, like any other delegation under
the Constitution, is limited by the object of the delegation. He thus suggests a subject
matter limitation on the treaty clause but rejects offering a specific definition of these
limits for fear of endorsing, by implication, all other uses of the power. In any event, he
states his belief that fear of abuse of the treaty power is mitigated by the fact that
treaties deal with external matters. In such external matters, a national representative
would naturally prefer the best interests of his own nation to that of the foreign parties.
Madison's faith in the new nationalist government and his distrust of the states,
especially in foreign affairs, is well known. Thus, it is not surprising that Madison
endorsed Corbin's argument, which Madison said "restrained the supremacy of these
[treaties] to the laws of the particular States, and not to Congress ....,,308 Again, he
emphasizes the importance of national control over treaties, noting that if treaties do
302. See Flaherty, supra note 6, at 2147-48.
303. 10 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 296, at 1392 (emphasis added).
304. 10 id. at 1395.
305. 10 id.
306. 10 id.
307. 10 id. at 1411 n.ll.
308. 10 id. at 1396.
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not "supercede [state] existing laws... [they] cannot be of any effect. ' ,309 But Madison
appears to have few problems with the possibility of Congress's laws coming into
conflict with treaties because he agrees with Corbin's statement that treaties do not
restrain Congress.
Again, the background assumptions about the interaction of law are crucial for
unpacking these complex and somewhat ambiguous statements. By endorsing
"restrain[t]" of "the supremacy" of treaties, Madison almost certainly referred to the
way "supremacy" is used in the Constitution to indicate a departure from the last-in-
time rule. Moreover, given Madison's prior statements about treaties and the last-in-
time rule and his intention to use these statements to reject Henry's claims about the
dangers of treaties, his endorsement of Corbin's statement is best understood as an
endorsement of what is today the prevailing understanding: treaties are supreme to
state law so that state law cannot override treaties, but treaties are not supreme to
federal statutes. If they are not supreme, then they are, as Madison previously
acknowledged, subject to the last-in-time rule.
2. New York
The most extensive explications of the treaty power and related issues in New York
took place in the medium of the Federalist Papers. Although seen today as sources of
overall original intent due to the reputation of their authors (Hamilton, Madison, and
Jay), the Federalist Papers should also be understood as crucial contributions to the
New York ratification debates. As such, it is important to consider them carefully
because scholars have found support in them for rejecting the last-in-time rule.310 A
more careful reading, however, shows that the Federalist Papers also do not
conclusively resolve this question.
a. Jay
John Jay offered one of the most detailed explications of the treaty power in
Federalist No. 64. His choice of this topic was not surprising given his role as
Secretary for Foreign Affairs in the Articles Congress. After explaining why the
combination of the President and Senate would be an ideal way of handling the
complex issues raised by foreign policy and treaty making, he responds to objections
about the treaties being "supreme laws of the land. 311
He begins by acknowledging that the supremacy of treaties over domestic law is
controversial. His opponents "insist and profess to believe, that treaties, like acts of
assembly, should be repealable at pleasure." 312 This "new and peculiar" doctrine leads
Jay to point out that foreign countries will be unlikely to make a bargain that would
bind them, but "on us only so long and so far as we may think proper to be bound by
it." He concedes that, like laws, "they who make treaties may alter or cancel them," but
309. 10 id.
310. See, e.g., Lobel, supra note 27, at 1094-98.
311. THE FEDERALIST No. 64, at 436-37 (John Jay) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
312. id. at 436.
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because treaties are created between two parties, the consent of both parties must "ever
afterwards be [needed] to alter or cancel them."
313
Jay appears here to be plainly rejecting the last-in-time rule for treaties, arguing that
treaties can never be altered or canceled without the consent of the other party. His
remarkable statement has been cited by critics of the last-in-time rule as evidence that
the rule has weak originalist foundations.
314
Jay's analysis is indeed remarkable, but it need not be fatal to the last-in-time rule.
First, Jay was almost certainly focused, as was everyone at the time, on the relationship
between treaties and state law. Hence, his discussion began as a defense of treaties
being "the supreme laws of the land," which is an obvious reference to the Supremacy
Clause and its subordination of state legislation to treaties.315
Second, Jay's view that treaties cannot be altered or cancelled without consent from
the other party correctly states the rule for ending treaties as a matter of international
law. But it does not confront the difficult question of when a treaty may be violated by
municipal legislation, which, as he well knows from his duties during the Articles
period, frequently occurs as a matter of municipal law even when such treaties remain
binding under international law.
Finally, the force of Jay's argument should also be considered in light of his final
claim, which echoes Madison's statements in Virginia: "The proposed Constitution
therefore has not in the least extended the obligations of treaties. They are just as
binding, and just as far beyond the lawful reach of legislative acts now, as they will be
at any future period, or under any form of government."
316
Internationalists have focused on Jay's claim that treaties are "beyond the lawful
reach of legislative acts .... ,317 But Jay is almost certainly arguing that treaties have
binding force under international law whether or not municipal legislatures choose to
violate them. This is the best way to make sense of his claim that the obligations of
treaties are the same under the Constitution as under the Articles because he conceded
that the Articles system allowed sovereigns to violate treaties by passing later in time
legislation.31 8 As a matter of international law, Jay is no doubt correct, which is why he
feels able to extend his claim beyond even the Articles and the Constitution to "any
form of government." 319 But as a matter of domestic municipal law, Jay's analysis does
not make any sense. Jay knew as well as anyone else that the municipal law status of
treaties, and indeed of the Articles themselves, was highly contested during the Articles
period and that the last-in-time rule was understood to apply to conflicts between state
law and treaties.
For these reasons, Jay's statements should not be understood as a clear rejection of
the last-in-time rule for treaties and federal statutes. Instead, Jay seems to be stating, as
the Articles Congress recognized in their request that states repeal offending statutes,
that treaties bind as a matter of international law despite being violated as a matter of
municipal law. Nothing in Jay's lengthy and influential discussion in the Federalist No.
313. Id. at 436-37.
314. See Lobel, supra note 27, at 1090-100.
315. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 311, at 436 (emphasis in original).
316. Id. at 437.
317. See, e.g., Lobel, supra note 27, at 1097 (quoting Jay, supra note 306, at 437).
318. See discussion, infra part IV.D.4.
319. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 311, at 437.
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64 suggests he is claiming anything more. It certainly cannot serve as conclusive or
even persuasive evidence for internationalist attacks on the last-in-time rule.
b. Hamilton
Jay's fellow New Yorker, Hamilton, offers a less ambiguous analysis of the treaty
power and its status as law. Hamilton is writing to respond to critics seeking the
inclusion of the House in the treaty process in order to avoid "intermixture" of
legislative and executive powers. 320 Hamilton observes that treaties "will be found to
partake more of the legislative than of the executive character, though it does not seem
strictly to fall within the definition of either of them." The power of making treaties
relates "neither to the execution of the subsisting laws, nor to the enaction of new ones.
... Its objects are CONTRACTS with foreign nations, which have the force of law, but
derive it from the obligations of good faith.",
321
Thus far, Hamilton's discussion of the necessity of having a single judicial tribunal
for enforcing treaties as laws reflects a more pragmatic view of the problems of treaties
operating as laws than the broad international concerns addressed by Jay. In discussing
the necessity of a judicial power, he declares that if treaties are "to have any force at
all, [they] must be considered as part of the law of the land. Their true import as far as
respects individuals, must, like all other laws, be ascertained by judicial
determinations."
322
Under the Articles, Hamilton points out, treaties "are liable to the infractions of
thirteen different Legislatures, and as many different courts of final jurisdiction, acting
under the authority of those Legislatures." 32 3 Thus, Hamilton grounded himself, unlike
Jay, in the problems of treaties as positive law and openly conceded that treaties were
overruled as a matter of domestic positive law during the Articles period.
c. Conclusions
To the extent that treaties were discussed during the ratification debates, both
Federalist and Anti-Federalists focused on what we would recognize today as the
federalism question. Treaties were supreme law of the land, and the debates appear to
confirm that the new Constitution was intended to prevent the state violations of
treaties that had occurred during the Articles period.
In this context, the question of the relationship between treaties and federal law was
largely overlooked. Surprisingly, the Anti-Federalists' main fear outside the federalism
context was that treaties could somehow trump the new Constitution. This argument
was rejected by all Federalists. But the very idea that a treaty (or any other federal law)
could override the Constitution reflects the pervasiveness of the concept of the last-in-
time rule during this period.
The Founding generation poster-child for internationalists, John Jay, did not
necessarily seek a complete rejection of the last-in-time rule. Like all participants in the
320. THE FEDERALIST No. 75, AT 504-05 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961).
321. Id.
322. THE FEDERALIST No. 22, at 143 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
323. Id. at 144.
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ratification debates, Jay focused on the supremacy of treaties over state law. Jay's
claim that treaties could never be cancelled without agreement by the other treaty party
reveals that he was probably analyzing treaties in their international character without
taking into account the complications of how to carry out treaties under municipal law.
Hence, Jay's analysis should not be taken as conclusive evidence that the Founders
rejected the last-in-time rule for treaties. In particular, Jay's ambiguous statements need
to be read against the arguably less ambiguous statements made by Corbin and
Madison during the Virginia convention. Corbin limited treaties' "supremacy" to state
laws, and Madison backed up his fellow Virginian Federalist's interpretation. If treaties
are supreme only to state laws, then the natural implication is that treaties are not
"supreme" over federal statutes. If so, then the background assumption of last in time,
of which Madison was well aware, applies.
G. Post-Founding Practice
To be sure, the ratification of the Constitution did not end disagreements about the
nature of the treaty law as domestic law. Indeed, only a few years after the new federal
government was established, it faced a national controversy over the legal effect of a
crucial treaty with Great Britain negotiated by then Chief Justice John Jay. In the
course of that debate, which focused on the role of the House in carrying out treaty
obligations, more evidence emerged that the last-in-time rule applied to treaties and
federal statutes.
1. The Jay Treaty
In 1795, John Jay negotiated a treaty to settle a number of continuing disputes
between the United States and Great Britain. The Jay Treaty, as it came to be known,
attempted to resolve the lingering dispute over the rights of British creditors to collect
pre-war American debts. It was this dispute over rights of British creditors and
legislation by states to nullify the rights of such creditors that had sparked Jay's
original report to Congress during the Articles period. Jay now proposed to settle this
problem once and for all by transferring all claims to an international commission.
324
The Jay Treaty has historical importance in its own right, but it also serves as the
first post-Founding battle over the status of treaties as domestic law. In particular, the
Jay Treaty revealed a sharp split between the pro-British Federalists and their pro-
French Republican opposition, who had greater numbers in the House than the
Senate. The Republicans in the House, led by James Monroe, organized opposition
to the Jay Treaty. Their first tactic was to demand that President Washington turn over
documents relating to the negotiations before the House would consider federal
legislation to carry out the treaty's obligations. Amid this debate, both sides confronted
an issue-the relationship of treaties to federal statutory law-that they had rarely
focused on before.
Washington appeared to realize that his response to the House's request would set a
precedent, so he consulted his legal advisers, including Secretary of Treasury Oliver
324. See generally BEMIS, supra note 259.
325. See id. at 88.
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Wolcott and Hamilton.326 He also received advice from then-Chief Justice Oliver
Ellsworth although it less clear that this advice was solicited. All three advised him to
reject the House's request although it is Wolcott's analysis that is the most relevant
because he self-consciously cites Congress' power to repeal a treaty as evidence that a
treaty is otherwise controlled by the President and Senate exclusively. Moreover, his
memorandum has been largely ignored by prior historical accounts of the status of
treaties as domestic law.
327
a. Wolcott
Wolcott began by reviewing the history of treaties under the Articles. He points out
that many of the Republican members of the House, including Monroe, had apparently
endorsed the power of Congress to enforce treaties directly against the states during the
Articles period. Wolcott goes on to describe the treaty power as an obligation of public
faith on behalf of the whole nation. These obligations are "justly and properly declared
to be laws; the legislative power is bound to regard and give them effect."
328
He then rejects the Republican claims that treaties only have an effect on state, as
opposed to federal, law. On a first reading, this appears to reject the approach Corbin
and Madison advanced in the Virginia convention. But Wolcott goes on to criticize the
Republican position as "nearly tantamount to a declaration that no treaty was binding
until confirmed by an act of Congress.' 329 This is not a rejection of last in time. Rather,
it is a rejection of non-self-execution for all treaties.
Excluding treaties from any matter controlled by Congress would not be a
"reasonable limitation upon the power of making treaties" because treaties must
necessarily change existing laws to be effective. 33 Finally, he points out that if treaties
could not repeal federal legislation, treaties of peace could not end war because they
could not, in theory, repeal a congressional declaration of war.
Having sketched out a robust view of treaties as domestic law, Wolcott then tries to
explain why an "unlimited" treaty power is reasonable. Simply because treaties could
be abused does not mean limitations must exist, he contends, because many of
Congress' powers are similarly unlimited. "The greatest abuses may happen under the
most restricted forms of government which have been yet devised." Furthermore, abuse
is less likely to go unchecked because
though treaties.., have the force and obligations of laws in the United States, it is
conceived that they are entitled to no precedence over acts of Congress. The
House of Representatives has at any time a power to originate a bill for declaring
326. See Samuel B. Crandall, Treaties, Their Making and Enforcement, in 21 STUD. IN
HIST. EcON. AND PUB. LAW, 115-21 (The Faculty of Political Science of Columbia University
eds., 1904).
327. In fact, the only discussion of this memo I have uncovered is in Crandall's
reference to it in 1904. See id.
328. MEMOIRS OF THE ADMINISTRATIONS OF WASHINGTON AND JOHN ADAMS, EDITED






war, or for doing any other act consistent with a treaty, and an act declaring a
treaty to be void would repeal its legal obligations and afford evidence that the
contract was at an end. 3
Wolcott's analysis thus takes a somewhat unexpected shift. Instead of defending
treaties' preeminence over all municipal law, as internationalists might expect, he
defends the President-Senate monopoly by devaluing treaties' longevity. Legislatures
are always presumed to regard their obligations of "justice, morality, and good faith"
and "the legislature are under no peculiar restrictions" when considering laws that
conflict with treaties. Therefore,
[i]t is not... true, as has been said, that treaties cannot repeal laws, and that laws
cannot repeal treaties. The reverse is true. Statutes and treaties of the United States
are alike supreme laws of the land, and the last act of whichever description, will
control the former. 332
What is surprising about Wolcott's analysis is that he could simply have argued that
treaties are supreme over federal law and thus Congress has no right to demand
documents related to treaty making. By conceding that treaties and statutes are "alike
supreme laws of the land," he actually opens the door to a Republican counter
argument that if Congress has the right to repeal a treaty, it certainly has the discretion
as to whether to implement one. Instead, he defends withholding the treaty documents
on the narrower grounds that "[i]n the exercise of the duties committed to the
President, secrecy and personal confidence are sometimes essential... and will not
"1333
always permit a full disclosure of all documents....
Thus, Wolcott made perhaps the first official recognition of the last-in-time rule for
treaties and statutes in a concession to the Republicans that did not obviously support
his overall legal position. Of course, the application of the rule to treaties did not
originate from this memorandum. Rather, his application of the last-in-time rule to
treaties and federal statutes flowed naturally from applying the basic priores contrarias
doctrine to the new framework created by the Constitution.
b. Ellsworth
Washington may have also solicited advice from the new Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court Oliver Ellsworth. In a letter dated March 13, 1796, five days after
being sworn in, Chief Justice Ellsworth wrote a letter to his fellow Connecticut
resident, Senator John Trumbull, concluding that the House's demand should be
rejected.334 This letter may also have been delivered to the President.335 Although he
reaches the same conclusion as Wolcott on the House's request, he goes further than
Wolcott in emphasizing the status of treaties.
331. Id. at 1796.
332. Id. (emphasis added).
333. Id. at 317.
334. See William R. Casto, Two Advisory Opinions by Chief Justice Oliver Ellsworth, 6
GREEN BAG 413 (2003).
335. Crandall, supra note 326, at 124-26.
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Like Wolcott, Ellsworth begins his letter with the Constitution's description of
treaties as supreme law of the land. As law, a treaty "instantly ipso facto repeals all
existing laws so far they interfere with it. This is an inseperable attribute of a Statute or
what has the effects of one .... He goes on to argue that "a Treaty can not be
repealed or annulled by Statute because it is a compact with a foreign power, and one
party to a compact can not dissolve it without the consent of the other."336 This appears
to be a plain rejection of the last-in-time rule for treaties and statutes. Ellsworth's
statement echoes Jay's approach in Federalist No. 64, except that, unlike Jay, he is
clearly analyzing a conflict between a treaty and federal (as opposed to state) law.
This placed treaties beyond the reach of either state or federal legislative acts and
allowed a foreign power to determine the applicability of a domestic law. But his
elaboration of this statement reveals that he believed statutes and treaties would rarely
conflict with each other. Statutes regulated commerce generally but treaties were
necessary to secure privileges for American commerce and simultaneously secure
privileges for the foreign party's commerce. Understood in this way, treaties and
statutes are "reconcilable [sic] and respectively competent to the ends for which they
were granted.,
337
Ellsworth's views are not quite as internationalist as they first appear. For instance,
he concedes that in other contexts, the House might legitimately seek treaty documents
for the purpose of rescinding a treaty. If, for instance, the House sought the papers to
"impeach or to originate a declaration of war," it might have a claim to the treaty
papers. 338 At least with respect to a declaration of war, Ellsworth recognizes that
Congress can, by law, repeal a treaty even without the other party's consent. Indeed, a
few years later, Congress abrogated a treaty with France-not by declaring war, but by
legislation passed in the midst of the Quasi-War with France during the late 1790s.
339
c. Hamilton
Hamilton also advised Washington to reject the House's demands, although his
proposed message for Washington came too late for Washington's consideration.m
Still, his reasoning is interesting because even though Hamilton is known for his stout
defense of executive powers, like the presidential power to make treaties, he agreed
with Wolcott that the last-in-time rule applied to treaties.
Hamilton identified the requirement of an agreement by a foreign sovereign as the
unique characteristic of treaties. Hence, treaties could not include a subsequent role for
the House because foreign sovereigns would have no guarantee of binding
performance. Additionally, Hamilton agreed that treaties could not be constrained to
those areas not governed by the federal legislative power. But then he draws an
important distinction between the House's current efforts to constrain treaty making
336. Casto, supra note 334, at 414.
337. Id. at 415.
338. Id.
339. Act of July 7, 1798, ch. 67, 1 Stat. 578, 578 (providing for the removal of all
obligations of the United States arising from treaties with France).
340. Alexander Hamilton, Message for Washington to Congress, in Reply to a Call for
Papers Relating to the Treaty with Great Britain (Mar. 20, 1796), reprinted in 7 WORKS OF
HAMILTON 118, 131 (Henry C. Lodge ed., 1886).
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and the power of the Congress as a whole. If the legislative power was competent to
repeal this law by a subsequent law, "it must be by the whole legislative power, not by
the mere refusal of one branch to give effect to it... A legal discretion to refuse the
execution of a pre-existing law is virtually a power to repeal it."34' In other words,
Hamilton advised Washington that while Congress might repeal a treaty, the House
alone could not.
Hamilton's involvement in this matter did not end after Washington rejected the
House's demands because the House then began a month-long debate on whether to
carry out the treaty. Hamilton launched a series of publications decrying the
• Republican House in what he called the "Defence." In these articles, he expanded and
clarified his thinking on the nature of treaties with respect to federal law.
In Defence No. XXXVII, Hamilton reviewed the various constitutional objections to
the Jay Treaty and found them wanting, not least because they appear to require
rejecting the majority of the twenty-eight articles of the treaty.342 In fact, many of the
objections appear to complain of the treaty's intrusion on Congressional powers.
Hamilton attacks these objections by pointing out how the same arguments about the
treaty's intrusions on Congress' powers could be made on behalf of the states, were it
not for the Supremacy Clause. Hamilton then claims, somewhat counter-intuitively,
that no such clause is needed because the scope of treaty power is understood to be co-
extensive with federal legislative power.
As such, the question naturally arises: "whether a Treaty can repeal preexisting
laws? '343 It is interesting that Hamilton phrased the issue in this way. He could have
followed Ellsworth and Jay and emphasized treaties' contractual and international
character. Instead, he focused on treaties' relationship to preexisting laws as opposed
to all laws. This focus only makes sense if one assumes, as he almost certainly did
given his prior statements and experience in Rutgers v. Waddington,3" that the last-in-
time rule could apply to treaties and statutes.
Echoing Wolcott, Hamilton concludes that because the Constitution gives "ipso
facto force of law to Treaties, making them equally with the Acts of Congress, the
supreme law of the land," a treaty must necessarily repeal an inconsistent, previously
enacted law.3 45 As authority for this doctrine, he cites "leges posteriors priores
contrarias abrogant." Thus, the last-in-time rule is applied to treaties because treaties
under the constitution are laws. The necessary implication of Hamilton's reliance on
this doctrine, however, is that statutes could override previously enacted treaties as
well. If treaties were understood to be "supreme" to federal statutes, then no recourse
to the last in time principles was necessary. Hamilton's analysis plainly accepts the
equality of treaties and federal statutes and the operation of "priores contraries," or the
last-in-time rule, to resolve conflicts between them. Given that the leading defender of
executive power could have supported the more aggressive internationalist conception
341. Id.
342. See Alexander Hamilton, Defence No. XXXVII, in 3 THE AMERICAN
REMEMBRANCER; OR AN IMPARTIAL COLLECTION OF ESSAYS, RESOLVES, SPEECHES, & RELATIVE,
OR HAVING AFFINITY, TO THE TREATY wrni GREAT BRITAIN, No. XII 259, 260 (Philadelphia,
Henry Tuckniss 1796).
343. See Hamilton, supra note 340, at 118-37.
344. See supra text accompanying notes 244-57.
345. Hamilton, supra note 340, at 118-37.
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articulated by Ellsworth, it is striking that he instead relied on the much weaker last in
time defense.
Overall, the experience of the post-Founding administration is illuminating because
characters central to the process of creating the Constitution were faced with difficult
decisions about the operation of the Constitution. While Hamilton is the most
prominent of the three discussed in this section, he, Ellsworth, and Wolcott could all
fairly be described as important contributors to the creation and establishment of the
Constitution. It is thus revealing that they do not fully agree on the relationship
between treaties and federal statutes. The more pragmatic-minded Hamilton and
Wolcott saw treaties and statutes as, for purposes of domestic law, completely
equivalent and subject to the last-in-time rule, Ellsworth's short advisory opinion
reflects a more idealistic view of domestic and foreign politics, which would require a
nation to bind itself and its domestic law under international treaties until the other
party cancels the treaty.
H. Summary
The leading internationalist account of the origins of the last-in-time rule offers an
incomplete picture of the Founding generation's approach to resolving conflicts
between treaties and domestic laws. It is true, as internationalist critics have
emphasized, that the Founding generation accepted the force of natural law and that
natural law was understood to include international law. It is also true, however, that
such law was not understood by most Americans to hold the status of positive
municipal law enforceable against a valid act of the legislature.
The Founding generation, steeped in the English legal tradition, followed much of
the Blackstonian conception of law, including the last-in-time rule. This rule,
understood in the Blackstonian framework, authorized a sovereign legislature to repeal
its own prior-enacted municipal law.
The Founders did not, however, import British conceptions of law wholesale. This
set the stage for one of the most important developments of the pre-Constitutional
period. The Founders sought to explicitly state the basic fundamental law of the state in
written form, and to shield that law from subsequent legislative acts. No such energy
was devoted to ensuring that treaties would also have a higher law status.
In fact, state legislatures during the Articles period felt free to repeal the offending
provisions in the Treaty of Paris, and the Articles Congress was reduced to requesting
states to again repeal those acts. Even the Articles themselves created only a league of
friendship, which was therefore subject to the last-in-time rule. Recognizing that even a
treaty between the states was subject to the last-in-time rule, key figures like Madison
sought to shield the new federal Constitution from the last-in-time rule by seeking
ratification by popular convention and to use that new Constitution to subordinate state
law.
To be sure, as internationalist scholars have argued, there is some evidence that
influential Founders like Jay and Ellsworth believed treaties were exempt from the last-
in-time rule. Historical analysis is seldom neat and its very messiness makes the use of
history in legal scholarship both tempting and dangerous. In this case, the overall
historical picture is not definitive. But the object of this section has not been to provide
ironclad historical proof for the propriety of the last-in-time rule. Instead, this rather
lengthy review of the historical evidence supplies was has heretofore been missing
from scholarship on the last-in-time rule: a coherent account of how and why Founding
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generation figures like Madison and Hamilton would have applied the last-in-time rule
to treaties and federal statutes.
Given the inadequacies of existing internationalist accounts of the same period, I
believe this account establishes that the last-in-time rule has a more substantial and
persuasive historical foundation than existing scholarship has admitted.
V. THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCEPTING THE LAST-IN-TIME RULE
In this Part, I explore the doctrinal and functional consequences of the last-in-time
rule. I conclude that accepting the last-in-time rule requires considering treaties and
federal statutes as "equivalent to an act of legislature" for all domestic law purposes.
This "equality" conception346 of treaties and federal statutes, first developed by
Marshall and supported by the text, structure, and history of the Constitution, gives
treaties the status of self executing law that can repeal prior federal statutes, but it
allocates final control over the domestic effect of treaties to Congress and subjects
treaties to constitutional limitations.
In this way, the equality conception strikes a compromise between internationalist
and revisionist views on the domestic effect of treaties. It requires greater political
accountability and legislative flexibility than internationalists would seek but it also
may encourage more U.S. participation in the development of "new" international law
than some revisionists would prefer.
A. The Equality Conception
At the heart of the last-in-time rule is a basic conception: treaties and statutes have
equal domestic legal status. Both are equally "Law." Thus, although statutes are made
by Congress via the processes set forth in Article I of the Constitution and treaties are
made by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate as mandated by
Article II, both result in "Law" of equal status within the domestic legal system. If
conflict occurs, the traditional maxim leges posteriors priores contrarias abrogant
applies. The equality conception challenges crucial elements of both the
internationalist and revisionist conceptions of treaties.
1. Challenging the Internationalist Conception
Needless to say, the equality of treaties and statutes undermines important
components of the internationalist conception. First, giving treaties and statutes equal
status means that treaties do not always trump federal statutes in the way that
internationalists have sought.347 The equality view concedes that treaties are laws, but
rejects internationalist attempts to make treaties more than laws, at least with respect to
federal statutes.
Second, while the equality principle accepts that treaties can repeal prior federal
statutes, it does not endorse internationalist claims that Congress or the Senate is
346. I borrow this term from Louis Henkin. See Henkin, supra note 5, at 872.
347. See supra text accompanying notes 107-113.
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powerless to subsequently limit or nullify the domestic effect of a treaty. 348 Accepting
that Congress has the power to repeal the domestic effect of a treaty means that
Congress should have the power to render any treaty non-self executing through
subsequent legislation." 9 In this way, the last-in-time rule supports the Senate's widely
criticized practice of conditioning consent to certain treaties through unilateral
declarations of non-self-execution. If Congress can extinguish the domestic effect of
treaties, than surely the Senate can, as part of its advice and consent process,
accomplish the same result.
35 0
Third, the equality of treaties and federal statutes strongly suggests that treaties are
subject to the same limitations imposed on statutes by the Constitution. This includes,
most controversially for internationalists, the same federalism limitations imposed on
Congress' Article I powers. The equality view requires this result because if treaties
could exceed the limitations imposed by federalism, such a treaty would also be
immune from congressional repeal.
2. Rejecting "Sovereigntist" Revisionism
On the other hand, the equality principle undermines "sovereigntist" revisionist
claims about the superiority of federal statutes over treaties.3 51 Under Professor Yoo's
conception, treaties and federal statutes could never come into conflict. 352 Any treaty or
statute intruding on the authority of the other would be nullified, whether or not it was
made last in time. At the very least, he argues, federal statutes should remain immune
to repeal by treaties.
The equality of treaties and statutes simply cannot co-exist with this framework. The
existence of the last-in-time rule and its recognition at the outset of the Constitution's
establishment, presupposes conflicts between federal legislation and treaties. Historical
practice confirms that treaties and statutes have overlapped in a variety of contexts
from the beginning of the Republic.353 Equality requires giving treaties full status as
domestic law, and this equality includes the power to repeal inconsistent prior-in-time
federal statutes.
In sum, the equality view does not accept important components of both the
internationalist and revisionist conceptions of treaties as laws. While the equality
conception agrees with the internationalists that treaties are "Law," it requires giving
treaties equal, not greater status than federal statutes. Treaties are "Law," no more and
no less.
348. See, e.g., MOORE, supra note 6, at 71-88; Sloss, supra note 6, at 135-36.
349. See Vazquez, supra note 6, at 174-75.
350. Id.
351. See discussion infra Part II.C.2.
352. See discussion infra Part II.C.2.
353. See supra text accompanying notes 31-40.
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B. The Advantages of Equality
1. Legislative Flexibility
By authorizing Congress to repeal the domestic effect of a treaty, the last-in-time
rule leaves ultimate control over a treaty's domestic effect with Congress. But this does
not mean that Congress will always act to weaken U.S. treaty compliance. Indeed,
critics of the last-in-time rule rarely consider the possibility that Congress may impose
a statutory exception to the last-in-time rule. For instance, Section 7852(d) of the
Internal Revenue Code specified that
[n]o provision of this title shall apply in any case where its application would be
contrary to any treaty obligation of the United States in effect on the date of
enactment of this title.
35
Prior to its repeal in 1988, this provision guaranteed that when a tax treaty and the
Internal Revenue Code came into conflict the tax treaty would prevail. The old
provision was first included in the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to ensure that the
Code did not conflict with existing tax treaty obligations.355 Subsequent tax acts
sometimes specified that the last-in-time rule did apply, while others held the
opposite. 356 Indeed, the amendment to Section 7852(d) maintained the superiority of
treaties with respect to a number of provisions. 357 For instance, section 894(a)
maintained in 1988 that "[i]ncome of any kind, to the extent required by any treaty
obligation of the United States, shall not be included in gross income..." and exempt
from taxation. 358 Courts have thus enforced treaty obligations in the face of later in
time statutes.33 9
Congress provided a similar suspension of the last-in-time rule when it enacted the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA") in 1976. Although the statute purported to
remove sovereign immunity from foreign countries in a variety of circumstances, the
act's effect was, "[slubject to existing international agreements to which the United
States is a party at the time of enactment of this Act."36° Congress thus suspended the
operation of the last-in-time rule with respect to the FSIA and earlier in time treaties.
Interestingly, the last-in-time rule means that subsequent treaties can override the
354. I.R.C. § 7852(d) (1986) (repealed 1988).
355. See Sachs, supra note 96, at 870.
356. See id. at 870-74. Many recent tax acts, by contrast, have specifically addressed
interaction with treaties. For instance, the Revenue Act of 1962 expressly provided that "section
7852(d) [giving preference to treaties]... shall not apply in respect of any amendment made by
this Act". Revenue Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-835, 76 Stat. 960, 1069-70 (1962). The Foreign
Investors Tax Act of 1966, however, took the opposite approach. Although that Act reduced the
burdens on foreign investors and thus no treaty violations were found, the Act (sec. 110)
specifically provided that it did not apply in any case where its application would be contrary to
any U.S. treaty obligation. Foreign Investors Tax Act of 1966, H.R. 13103, 89th Cong. § 110
(1966).
357. See id. at 318-20.
358. I.R.C. § 894(a) (1988).
359. See, e.g., Aiken Indus., Inc. v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 56 T.C. 925 (1971).
360. 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (2000).
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FSIA, thus guaranteeing that treaties will always trump the FSIA provisions whether
earlier or later in time.
Understood in this light, the last-in-time rule is not a license for Congress to ignore
treaty obligations, as some internationalists have suggested. Instead, the last-in-time
rule gives Congress the flexibility to reconcile domestic and treaty law in the manner it
sees fit. In some cases, as with much of the Internal Revenue Code and the FSIA,
Congress specified that treaties would trump even later in time statutes. In other cases,
Congress decided otherwise.361 But in all cases, Congress remained responsible for
controlling the interaction of treaties and domestic law. Of course, it could also choose,
as it has done on many occasions in the past, to leave control to the states. 362 The point
is that the last-in-time rule leaves Congress a menu of options for carrying out these
treaty obligations.
In contrast, if the last-in-time rule did not exist, Congress's menu of options would
be reduced to one. Discarding the last-in-time rule would eliminate any role for
Congress and require the adherence to treaties at all times. Treaties would always
trump statutes, and no federal institution would have the authority to change that rule
as a matter of domestic law. In this way, the critics of the last-in-time rule are seeking
to enshrine international obligations into an inflexible law that cannot be adjusted or
modified through the political process. Such an approach denigrates the importance of
preserving a role for Congress in the supervision of international law.
363
But it is far from obvious that all treaties should be shielded from the normal
domestic political process. Some treaties deal with individual human rights, others
relate to tax treatment, while still others concern themselves with contract
interpretation. It is simply implausible that all treaties have an equal policy claim on
"higher" status, as the Restatement seems to recognize. 364 Some treaties might need to
be shielded from normal congressional repeal, but others do not. Without the last-in-
time rule, no domestic institution would have the ability to make such a judgment.
2. Greater Political Accountability
As discussed in Part 1, the rise of a new kind of international law poses new
challenges for U.S. foreign relations law.365 Internationalist scholars have generally
supported greater authority for international organizations and international law within
the U.S. system. For this reason, they have argued in favor of a treaty power
361. See, e.g., Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"), 28 U.S.C. §
2254(a), (e)(2) (1994 & Supp. IV). See generally Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 376 (1998)
(interpreting AEDPA so that a habeas petitioner alleging violations of "treaties of the United
States" will, as a general rule, not be afforded an evidentiary hearing if he "has failed to develop
the factual basis of [the] claim in State court proceedings").
362. See Ku, supra note 62, at 501-06.
363. For a creative and important proposal for resolving the status of customary
intemational law by seeking Congressional statutory incorporation, see T. Alexander Aleinikoff,
International Law, Sovereignty, and American Constitutionalism: Reflections on the Customary
International Law Debate, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 91 (2004).
364. See RESTATEMENT (THiRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 115n. 1 (1987).
365. Ku, supra note 18, at 83-88.
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unrestrained by federalism, 366 the self-execution of treaties, 367 and greater authority for
international organizations.
368
Each strain of the internationalist conception seeks to shield international law from
various mechanisms of political control. For instance, an unrestrained treaty power is
free from control by state government and a self-executing treaty "supreme" over
federal statutes is free from control by the House of Representatives. When combined
with internationalist enthusiasm for international institutions to interpret these treaties
unconstrained by a non-delegation doctrine, treaties are also free from the control of
the President and the Senate after their initial approval. This results in less participation
by the political branches of the American system, both state and federal, in the creation
and implementation of international treaties. I have argued elsewhere that the lack of
domestic political participation in the creation and administration of international law
undercuts that law's political legitimacy.369 International law, which already suffers
from a "democracy deficit" and questions about its legitimacy needs more, rather than
less endorsement, by the domestic political process.
The last-in-time rule serves as a sort of last line of defense in favor of political
control over treaties. Even a self-executing treaty, unconstrained by federalism and
controlled by an international organization, is still subject to repeal by congressional
enactment under the last-in-time rule. In this way, the last-in-time rule serves as an
insurance policy against excessive internationalization of U.S. law by treaties. Most
importantly, it continues to place the ultimate decision over the domestic effect of an
international treaty in the political branches of the federal government.
3. More Treaties
Somewhat ironically, the last-in-time rule's role as a last line of sovereigntist
defense could end up encouraging greater U.S. participation in the development of the
new international law. The internationalist conception of treaties poses a difficult
dilemma for U.S. treaty makers. Once they approve a treaty, they essentially cede
control over the treaty to the judiciary, foreign governments, and/or international
institutions. 370 Many modern international treaties transfer interpretive authority over a
treaty to international tribunals such as the World Trade Organization panels or the
International Court of Justice. Indeed, at least one member of the Supreme Court has
argued that the international tribunal controls the final authoritative interpretation of
the treaty for domestic law purposes.371 Such an authoritative interpretation by an
366. See, e.g., Lori F. Damrosch, The Role of the United States Senate Concerning
"Self-Executing" and "Non-Self-Executing" Treaties, 67 CHM.-KENr L. REV. 515 (1991).
367. See, e.g., Paust, supra note 108, at 775-78.
368. See Ku, supra note 18, at 75.
369. See id. at 121-31.
370. 1 have elsewhere described this process as a type of delegation. See id. at 80.
371. There are indications that at least some members of the current Supreme Court are
willing to accept this type of delegation of treaty interpretation. Justice Breyer, dissenting from a
denial of certiorari, has argued that the Court should at least consider whether its own treaty
interpretation should be revised in light of an authoritative interpretation of that same treaty by
the International Court of Justice. See Torres v. Mullin, 540 U.S. 1035 (2003).
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international tribunal would override Supreme Court interpretations of the same
treaty.
372
Private litigants in both international and domestic settings will have incentives to
use international treaties to advance a variety of public law concerns,373 as they have
already done in the context of customary international law and human rights
litigation. 74 Given these possibilities, it is not surprising that the Senate has been
hesitant to approve many major international agreements and that when they have done
so, they have increasingly sought to declare such treaties non-self-executing.
3 75
Without the last-in-time rule, the treaty makers would probably become even more
hesitant to enter into treaties. The ability to impose limitations on the domestic effect
of treaties has been a crucial factor in smoothing Senate passage of the major postwar
international human rights agreements.376 If treaty makers lose the backstop of the last-
in-time rule as well, their incentive to avoid making treaties would grow even stronger.
CONCLUSION
Treaties matter. This is hardly an original insight, yet it is nonetheless true that
treaties hold the potential to become a central source of domestic lawmaking for the
United States system. The explosion of international law in an era of globalization
means that more and more treaties will seek to regulate new and different areas of law.
The potential of treaties to reshape domestic law troubled Americans even before
the Constitution was adopted. In recent years, scholars have reopened questions about
the status of treaties in domestic law and divided into two main groups.
Internationalists believe international law, in particular treaty law, should become a
more important and powerful force within domestic U.S. law. Revisionists have argued
that the internationalization of U.S. law cannot occur at the expense of traditional
constitutional limitations and concerns for democratic accountability.
The last-in-time rule, one of the least controversial - and least understood -
doctrines of U.S. treaty law, does not fit comfortably into either conception. This may
explain, at least partially, why it has drawn criticism from both sides. Most importantly,
existing scholarship has failed to provide a meaningful defense of the rule. Indeed, as
currently understood, the rule has no academic defenders nor have courts offered any
serious textual, structural, or historical defense of the rule.
This article has provided just such a defense based on the text and structure of the
Constitution and the historical evidence of the Founders' understanding of the
relationship between treaties and statutes. Following Chief Justice Marshall, who
explained that treaties are "equivalent to an act of legislation" under the Constitution,
treaties are "Law" under the Constitution and serve as a basis for federal court
372. Id.
373. The most influential advocate of using international law in this regard is Dean
Harold Koh. His conception of using public law litigation to develop and strengthen
international law norms has been enormously influential. See, e.g., Harold H. Koh, Why Do
Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599 (1997).
374. See, e.g., Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,
630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).




jurisdiction. The text and structure of the Constitution can (and should) be read to give
treaties equal, as opposed to superior or subordinate status, with respect to federal
statutory law.
A review of the historical materials related to the Founding of the Constitution
confirms this textual and structural understanding. The concept of "Law" during the
Founding era slowly evolved from a Blackstonian framework of municipal law
controlled exclusively by the sovereign to a uniquely American concept of a higher law
declared and controlled by the "people" as sovereign. This evolution in American
thinking, however, also confirms the baseline assumption that all forms of law were
subject to the last-in-time rule, or modification at the will of the legislative sovereign.
The historical record on how treaties were supposed to fit into this system is far
from clear or conclusive. While the historical record remains somewhat murky, the
bulk of evidence, largely overlooked by previous scholarship, supports the application
of the last-in-time rule. Some Founders, like John Jay and Oliver Ellsworth, appeared
to elevate treaties beyond even federal law, while others, like James Madison,
Alexander Hamilton and Oliver Wolcott, sought to defend the treaty power by
emphasizing its subjugation to the last-in-time rule. Ultimately, the last-in-time rule
prevailed. Its eventual adoption should not be completely surprising because it flowed
from the basic conception of law that underlay most of the Founders' thinking.
The acceptance of the last-in-time rule requires adopting an equality conception of
treaties and federal statutes. This equality principle both supports and rejects elements
of the internationalist and revisionist approaches to the domestic effect of treaties.
In addition to the textual and structural arguments outlined above, there are -sound
functional reasons to support the equality conception, even in a world dominated by the
new international law. The equality conception strikes an elegant compromise between
the need to participate in the development of the new international law and basic
American commitments to political accountability and democratic control over
domestic lawmaking. Indeed, the last-in-time rule may serve as an insurance policy
encouraging treaty makers to participate in the development of international law.
Without the last-in-time rule, U.S. treaty makers will lose the flexibility they currently
hold to decide how best to balance international policy concerns with domestic
obligations. In this way, the last-in-time rule may actually serve to encourage, rather
than discourage, U.S. participation in the development of the new international law.
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